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Immigration Advocacy as            
Labor Advocacy 
Kati L. Griffith and Tamara L. Lee†  
As immigration reform efforts continue to experience fits and starts in 
Congress, immigrant and non-immigrant workers have joined together to 
advocate for immigration reform at the federal level and to protest the surge 
of exclusionary immigration measures at the state and local levels.  These 
advocacy efforts demonstrate that many workers connect immigration law to 
workplace conditions.  This Article develops a comprehensive analytical 
framework for viewing immigration advocacy as labor advocacy, even though 
these two statutory regimes have completely separate policymaking processes.  
It uncovers the historical roots of the interplay between immigration law and 
labor issues. Similarly, it elaborates the ways that a workplace law, the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), has the potential to protect a broad 
range of workers’ immigration advocacy efforts.  To date, scholars have 
largely focused on how restrictive aspects of immigration law narrow 
workplace protections, such as minimum wage and safety standards.  In 
contrast, this Article shows how the interaction between immigration law and 
workplace law can broaden workplace protections in some circumstances.  By 
constructing an analytical lens that views immigration law in relationship to 
workplace law, this Article illuminates why it is crucial to simultaneously 
consider these two statutory regimes.  In doing so, it also reveals new 
opportunities for immigrant and worker advocates to come together around 
shared interests. 
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IMMIGRATION ADVOCACY AS LABOR ADVOCACY1 
INTRODUCTION 
As immigration reform efforts continue to experience fits and starts in 
Congress, millions of immigrant and non-immigrant workers have joined 
together both to advocate for immigration reform at the federal level and to 
protest the surge of exclusionary immigration measures at the state and 
local levels.2  During the 2006 “Days Without Immigrants” campaign, 
thousands of immigrants missed work to join rallies across the country in 
order to demonstrate the importance of immigrants to the economy.3  Many 
 
 1. This title was inspired by the title of Professor Benjamin I. Sachs’ article, Employment Law as 
Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008).  Similar to Sachs’ article, this Article considers how two 
seemingly separate statutory regimes relate to each other in unexpected ways.  For Sachs, the failures of 
labor law to protect collective action among workers created “a hydraulic effect,” whereby workers 
started to turn to employment law for protection of collective activity.  Id. at 2687. 
 2. See, e.g., Julia Preston, At Rally, Call for Urgency on Immigration Reform, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 22, 2010, at A12 (“The crowd, overwhelmingly Latino immigrants, arrived on buses from 
California, Ohio, Texas, Michigan, Colorado and many other places. Unions brought thousands of 
members.”); Stephen Franklin, May Day rally highlights connection between labor, immigrant causes, 
CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2008, at C3 (“[Unions] have put out fliers and called on people to march, and they 
haven’t just called on immigrants.”); Laura Pulido, A day without immigrants: the racial and class 
politics of immigrant exclusion, ANTIPODE 39, Jan. 2007, at 1, 1-7 (2007) (estimating that over a million 
people participated in the 2006 rally). 
 3. See Michael C. Duff, Days Without Immigrants: Analysis and Implications of the Treatment of 
Immigration Rallies Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 DEN. U. L. REV. 93, 93 n.1 (2007) 
[hereinafter Days Without Immigrants] (referring to “hundreds of thousands” participants); Rachel M. 
Simon, Comment, Workers on the March: Work Stoppages, Public Rallies, and the National Labor 
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labor unions have joined these efforts, educating and mobilizing their 
members about the need for immigration reform from a workers’ rights 
perspective.4  Many unions, for instance, joined the campaign to “Reform 
Immigration FOR America,” which “seeks to unite public and civic, 
religious, labor and business groups to advocate for just, humane, and 
comprehensive immigration reform legislation.”5  In June 2009, when 
Congress was actively considering immigration reform, the campaign 
organized 112 public events around the country.6  Despite ongoing 
divisions, the two main labor congresses, the AFL-CIO and Change to Win, 
representing over sixteen million workers, recently came together to 
support a common immigration reform platform.7 
These efforts illustrate that workers and unions recognize the “overlap 
between labor and immigrant issues.”8  In calling attention to this 
relationship, they remind us that immigration law9 and the laws providing 
 
Relations Act, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1274-75 (2007) (“Some employees asked for the day off ahead 
of time, others worked extra hours or switched shifts in order to make up the time, while another group 
of employees simply did not show up to work.”); Wesley Kennedy & Angie M. Cowan, A Touch of 
“Class”: Immigration and the Intersection of Politics and Protected Section 7 Activity, 23 LAB. LAW. 
99, 102 (2007) (noting that the focus of these rallies was to “dramatize . . .  the importance of immigrant 
workers to the economy”). 
 4. See, e.g., Christopher Nulty, From New England to the Southwest, SEIU Members Continue 
Push for Immigration Reform, SEIU BLOG, June 4, 2010, available at http://www.seiu.org/2010/06/ 
from-new-england-to-the-southwest-seiu-members-continue-push-for-immigration-reform.php 
(describing immigration efforts across the country); Philip Rucker, Nation Digest, WASH. POST, May 2, 
2010, at A03 (“[O]ne of the nation’s most politically powerful labor organizations [] is staging 16 
demonstrations on Saturday.”); AFL-CIO, Immigration, available at 
http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Immigration (calling for immigration reform and stating that “immigration 
policy is a blueprint for employer manipulation and abuse, and both immigrant and American workers 
are suffering the consequences.”). 
 5. Over 200 Labor, Immigrant Groups Unite To Launch Immigration Legislation Campaign, 
DAILY LAB. REP., June 4, 2009; UFW group joins immigration effort, THE CALIFORNIAN, June 1, 2009, 
at 2.  See also AFL-CIO, Immigration, supra note 4 (providing a sample resolution which states, in part, 
“Whereas the labor movement is working with allies, including the Reform Immigration for America 
Campaign to promote comprehensive immigration reform . . . be it finally resolved [that] the . . . AFL-
CIO will continue to work with allies to promote comprehensive immigration reform . . .”). 
 6. UFW group joins immigration effort, THE CALIFORNIAN, June 1, 2009, at 2. 
 7. See AFL-CIO & Change To Win, The Labor Movement’s Framework for Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform (2009) [hereinafter The Labor Movement’s Framework], available at 
http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/7389/79487/version/1/file/immigrationreform053111.pdf. 
 8. Stephen Franklin, May Day rally highlights connection between labor, immigrant causes, CHI. 
TRIB., May 2, 2008, at C3.  See also Raids, I-9 Audits Undercut Worker Rights AFL-CIO Worker 
Groups Say in New Report, DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 28, 2009 (noting the AFL-CIO’s view that “the 
division between labor and immigration enforcement has eroded.”).  While this article mainly focuses 
on national efforts, there are also sub-federal efforts.  See, e.g., Elliot Spagat, Massive rally in Los 
Angeles to protest Arizona’s tough illegal immigrant law, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 1, 2010 
(noting a union member’s “need to protest the Arizona legislation”). 
 9. While we refer broadly to “immigration law,” some scholars distinguish between 
“immigration law” and “immigrant law.”  See, e.g., Lauren Gilbert, National Identity and Immigration 
Policy in the U.S. and the European Union, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 99, 133-36 (2008) (describing 
2. GRIFFITH LEE COMPLETE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2012  6:17:08 PM 
76 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 33:1 
 
employment protections to both documented and undocumented workers, 
interact in complex ways even though they have completely separate 
policymaking processes.10  Much like worker advocates, scholars have 
begun to address the amalgamation of these two areas of law, or what one 
of our authors has dubbed immployment law.11  To date, scholars have 
largely focused on the ways that immigration law operates to narrow 
workplace protections related to minimum wage, employment 
discrimination, health and safety standards, and labor organizing 
(collectively referred to as “workplace law”) for documented and 
undocumented workers alike.12 One scholar, for instance, referred to 
immigration law’s effect as “devastating” to labor protections for workers.13 
 
immigration law as “elaborate classification schemes for determining which noncitizens will be allowed 
admission on a temporary or permanent basis” and characterizing immigrant law as efforts to 
“integrat[e] noncitizens into our community once they are here”). 
 10. Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies 
of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 740 (2003) [hereinafter Ghost 
Workers] (“Historically, immigration law and labor law have not been linked in the policymaking 
process.”).   See also id. (stating that “this disconnect has led to a failure to see immigration as a labor 
issue and vice versa”); Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1461 
(2008) (“As the immigration debate unfolds in Congress, the media, and the public, labor advocates and 
scholars have critical insights and expertise to contribute. It is hard to imagine a positive outcome for 
low-wage workers without labor’s sustained engagement in the details of these proposals and unyielding 
insistence for fundamental worker protections.”). 
 11. See generally Kati L. Griffith, Discovering ‘Immployment’ Law: The Constitutionality of 
Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389 (2011) [hereinafter 
Discovering ‘Immployment’ Law]. 
 12. For articles detailing these negative effects see Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement 
Versus Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant 
Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 303 (2010) [hereinafter Immigration Enforcement Versus 
Employment Law Enforcement]; Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of 
Immigration Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125 (2009) 
[hereinafter U.S. Migrant Worker Law]; Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney 
General: A Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 
248 (2009); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Immigrant Workers and the Fifth 
Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 46 (2008) [hereinafter Fear of Discovery]; Michael J. Wishnie, 
Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
193 (2007). 
 13. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CALIF. L. REV. 503, 538 n.122 
(2007) (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of IRCA’s effects).  See also Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Evolving Definition of the Immigrant Worker: The Intersection Between Employment, 
Labor, and Human Rights Law: Foreword: Dangerous Intersection, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 241 (2009) 
(describing the intersection of laws that affect undocumented workers as “dangerous”); Bill Ong Hing, 
Asian Americans and Immigration Reform, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 83, 104 (2010) (stating that “a close look” 
at workplace raids to enforce IRCA “reveals that employer sanctions have had disastrous effects on all 
workers”); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1107 
(2009) (describing IRCA’s effects as “harsh” and stating that some employers “use their de facto 
immunity from sanctions to negotiate low wages, disregard workplace protections, and otherwise 
suppress worker dissent.”); Dennise A. Calderon-Barrera, Hoffman v. NLRB: Leaving Undocumented 
Workers Unprotected Under United States Labor Laws?, 6 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 119, 119 (2003) 
(exploring the “negative impact” of IRCA on labor law protections for undocumented workers). 
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While we largely agree with these characterizations, this Article 
highlights how the interaction between immigration law and workplace law 
can actually broaden protections for employees.  In doing so, we illustrate a 
crucial, yet under-theorized, aspect of the evolving crossroads between 
immigration law and workplace law.  As our prime illustration of this 
broadening, we demonstrate the National Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA’s) 
potential to protect a wide swath of employees’ immigration advocacy 
efforts from employer interference.  The NLRA grants private-sector 
employees, including undocumented employees,14 the right to engage in 
certain forms of collective activity without employer interference.15  
Notably, the NLRA protects employees from adverse employment actions 
that result from their participation in efforts to influence judicial, executive, 
or legislative actors (“advocacy”), as long as the content of their message 
relates sufficiently to “employees’ interests as employees.”16  As we will 
show, immigration law’s potential negative and positive effects on 
employees’ workplace experiences broaden the conventional scope of what 
constitutes employees’ interests as employees and therefore the scope of the 
NLRA’s protection of immigration advocacy.17 
In this Article, we call for a comprehensive analytical framework that 
views immigration advocacy as labor advocacy.  This framework has 
implications for the existing scholarship described above and for doctrinal 
analyses of legal cases relating to employees’ immigration advocacy efforts.  
As we will more fully explore in Part III, it also has broader implications 
for social movement advocacy and worker solidarity moving forward.  To 
set the stage for our proposed framework, Part I of this Article draws from 
 
 14. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) (concluding that undocumented 
workers are NLRA “employees”); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144-47 
(2002) (assuming that undocumented workers are NLRA “employees”). 
 15. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)). 
 16. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB., 437 U.S. 556, 566-67 (1978).  But see Benjamin Sachs, Employment 
Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2697 (2008) (noting the NLRA’s “inability to deter or 
remedy coercive interference with the organizing efforts of employees who are entitled to the Act’s 
protection”). 
 17. See Gary W. Spring, A New Methodology for Testing Permissible Political Communications in 
the Workplace, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2008) (contending that NLRA’s legislative history 
shows Congress’ intent to broadly protect advocacy); Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political 
Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1981) (arguing for broad 
protection of advocacy and stating that courts and the NLRB need to realize that “political activity will 
increasingly supplement or supersede labor’s traditional economic activity”).  To realize this potential, 
labor must turn to the NLRA. See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of 
Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 236 (2010) (“[L]abor advocates must be willing to use what is left of 
the NLRA to push forward a pro-union agenda . . . If anything, labor advocates . . . have nearly 
abandoned the NLRA. That would be an effective strategy if the NLRA did not have primary and often 
exclusive jurisdiction over labor-management disputes.”). 
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immigration law history to provide a justification for why immigration 
advocacy should be considered labor advocacy.  It exposes the intensifying 
interplay between the policies underlying these two seemingly separate 
statutory regimes.  It also draws from the existing scholarship to highlight 
how immigration law—as interpreted by employers, workers, enforcement 
agents and courts—has narrowed employees’ workplace protections.  
Immigration law’s narrowing effects underscore why we should view 
immigration law as a labor issue. 
Part II engages in doctrinal analysis to highlight the outer boundaries 
of the NLRA’s potential to protect a wide spectrum of employees’ 
immigration advocacy from employer interference.  It contends that 
employees’ immigration advocacy can and should be treated as a type of 
labor advocacy which is protected under the law.  We draw from existing 
case law to show that the ways that labor unions have framed the need for 
immigration reform in the recent past sufficiently relate to employees’ 
interests as employees.18  Thus, we focus in particular on the threshold 
question of whether the NLRA protects employee advocacy messages, or 
“frames,” about the need for immigration reform.19  The National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) has not fully addressed this issue to date,20 
creating uncertainty for employees and labor unions,21 that are increasingly 
 
 18. While we focus on labor’s recent statements, even labor’s more anti-immigrant statements 
about the need for immigration reform in the past would have been NLRA protected as long as they 
were sufficiently related to employees’ interests as employees. 
 19. For an article that discusses the NLRA’s protection of framing in the context of political 
activity see Paul E. Bateman, Concerted Activity – The Intersection Between Political Activity and 
Section 7 Rights, 23 LAB. LAW. 41 (2007). 
 20. In 2006, the NLRB General Counsel “assume[d], without deciding,” that employees’ support 
of immigration reform falls within the NLRA’s protection.  Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, 
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Robert W. Chester, Reg’l Dir., Region 18, NLRB, regarding Reliable 
Maint., Case 18-CA-18119, at *1 (October 31, 2006).  In 2008, the NLRB General Counsel signaled that 
some immigration advocacy is protected but did not elaborate.  Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, 
Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Regional Directors, NLRB, regarding Guideline Memorandum Concerning 
Unfair Labor Practice Charges Involving Political Advocacy, 7 (July 22, 2008) available at 
https://www.nlrb.gov/publications/general-counsel-memos (Select “2008” from drop-down menu; then 
follow GC-08 hyperlink) (“In the immigration demonstration cases . . . we assumed, and therefore did 
not decide, that employee participation in the demonstrations was protected . . . Although it was not 
necessary to resolve the issue in those cases, it is clear from the analytical framework set forth above 
that participation in such demonstrations” was protected).  See Days Without Immigrants, supra note 3, 
at 94 n.6 (stating that the NLRB’s “[a]dvice memoranda are documents that announce the willingness of 
the NLRB to pursue legal issues”). 
 21. See Spring, supra note 17, at 1023-24 (2008) (“[P]rivate employees have faced uncertainty as 
to what may be communicated”); Bateman, supra note 19, at 57 (stating that, due to the Board’s failure 
to clarify “how different political activity effectuates the stated policy goals of the Act, unions, 
employers, and employees alike are left to a case-by-case determination of the scope of [the NLRA’s] 
coverage of political activities”); Hyde, supra note 17,  at 14 (suggesting that it can be problematic when 
employees are unsure about whether their political advocacy is NLRA protected). 
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confronted with these issues.22  In this Article, we do not focus on the 
subsequent question of whether employees lose this protection given the 
types of activity they engage in to advance immigration advocacy 
messages—such as wearing immigration reform buttons at work or missing 
work to attend immigration rallies.23  Scholars and commentators have 
thoroughly covered that area.24  By illustrating that the interaction between 
immigration law and workplace law can expand employees’ workplace 
protections, Part II’s doctrinal analysis shows the limits of the prior 
scholarship’s unilateral focus on the narrowing effects of immigration law. 
Part III examines implications for our proposed immigration advocacy 
as labor advocacy framework in practice.  It shows how the framework, 
while not a panacea from a workplace rights perspective, creates 
opportunities for enhanced worker solidarity between immigrants and non-
immigrants and for workplace-based immigration advocacy by labor unions 
and immigrant-worker groups.  It draws on studies of law and social 
movement advocacy to explore how the framework in general, and the 
NLRA in particular, could have practical and symbolic benefits that aid 
advocates who want to engage immigrant and non-immigrant workers in 
immigration advocacy efforts. 
I. 
IMMIGRATION LAW AS A LABOR ISSUE 
Immigration advocacy should be viewed through a labor advocacy lens 
because immigration law has increasingly become a labor issue.  In this 
 
 22. See Days Without Immigrants, supra note 3, at 94 n.6 (“In light of present immigration trends, 
the emergence of immigration protest issues will likely continue.”). 
 23. After the 2006 immigration rallies, some employers took adverse employment actions against 
rally participants who missed work.  See Bateman, supra note 19, at 42 (noting that “at least a dozen 
unfair labor practice charges were filed with the NLRB involving the discipline of workers who 
participated in the rallies”).  In the NLRB cases that followed, the NLRB did not find any NLRA 
violations, concluding that the employers’ actions were caused by something other than the employees’ 
participation in the rallies.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, 
NLRB, to Irving E. Gottschalk, Reg’l Dir., Region 30, NLRB, regarding Marshall & Ilsley Corp., Case 
30-CA-17442 (July 12, 2006); Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to 
Peter B. Hoffman, Reg’l Dir., Region 34, NLRB, regarding Gargiulo Constr. Co., Nos. 34-CA-11473 
and 34-CA-11499, at *1 (July 12, 2006); Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, 
NLRB, to Alan Reichard, Reg’l Dir., Region 32, NLRB, regarding El Cerrito Elec. Co., Case 32-CA-
22661 (August 16, 2006); Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Martha 
Kinard, Reg’l Dir., Region 16, NLRB, regarding Joe's Coffee Shop, Case 16-CA-25014, at *1-2 
(October 30, 2006); Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Stephen M. 
Glasser, Reg’l Dir., Region 18, NLRB, regarding Discount Paper, Case 7-CA-49543, at *1 (October 31, 
2006). 
 24. See, e.g., Days Without Immigrants, supra note 3, at 93 n.3 (examining whether the NLRA 
protects employees from firing due to unexcused absences from work to attend rallies); Simon, supra 
note 3, at 1273 (same); Kennedy &  Cowan, supra note 3, at 99 (same). 
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Part, we first expose the interplay between immigration law and workplace 
law, two otherwise separate statutory regimes whose relationship grew 
closer in the early twentieth century and again in the mid-1980s.  This 
review illustrates Congress’s intent for immigration law to expand, rather 
than constrain, workplace protections for employees.  We then describe the 
existing scholarship on the crossroads between immigration law and 
workplace law, which is dominated by labor-related critiques that stress 
immigration law’s harmful effects in practice.  These critiques about 
negative effects on employees’ workplace protections further demonstrate 
why advocacy targeting immigration law should be considered labor 
advocacy. 
A. The Long and Intensifying Interplay 
The close relationship between immigration law and labor issues is 
apparent given how immigration law, at various historical moments, has 
acknowledged perceived labor market needs, directly incorporated 
workplace protections for employees, and focused on the workplace as a 
primary site for immigration enforcement.  In these ways, immigration laws 
have covered some of the same subject matter as workplace law.  “Open 
borders” as well as “closed borders” immigration policies have always been 
associated with perceived labor market conditions.25  The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 provides an early example.26  In the mid-nineteenth 
century, the United States encouraged Chinese laborers to migrate to the 
United States to work.  Racism against these laborers intensified, however, 
during the deep recession of the 1870s.  As a result, the 1882 Act restricted 
Chinese laborers from coming to the United States for ten years.27 
The perception that the United States did not need additional laborers 
also led to restrictive immigration measures that emerged in the early 
twentieth century.  By 1920, there was “no longer [a] need [for] the same 
 
 25. See MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND ALIEN CITIZENS AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 19 (2004).  See also Ghost Workers, supra note 10, at 765 (stating that 
immigration to the United States and work “have been intertwined phenomena throughout history”). 
 26. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Magnuson Act of 1943, ch. 
344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600.  Some scholars have noted that the policy of slavery was the first form of labor 
immigration.  See Rhonda V. Magee, Slavery as Immigration?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 273, 276 (2009) 
(describing slavery as the first form of labor immigration and showing that, as a result of forced labor 
migration, the U.S. immigration system has been “inculcated with the notion of a permanent, quasi-
citizen-worker underclass and privileged white ethnics under naturalization law”). 
 27. See MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, IMMIGRATION & IMMIGRANTS: SETTING THE 
RECORD STRAIGHT 9 (1994) (“Chinese immigrants had been imported to work during the labor 
shortages of the 1840s, but became increasingly reviled during the recessionary times of the 1870s. In 
response to popular pressure, the Chinese Exclusion Act suspended immigration of Chinese laborers for 
10 years . . . .”). 
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levels of mass migration.”28  The restrictive Immigration Act of 1924 thus 
came about, at least in part, because “industrial capitalism had matured to 
the point where economic growth could come more from technological 
advances in mass production than from a continued expansion of the 
manufacturing workforce.”29  Similarly, due to high unemployment rates, 
the United States repatriated hundreds of thousands of Mexicans back to 
Mexico during the Great Depression.30  Congress’s response to these 
perceived labor market needs through immigration law continues in modern 
temporary visa programs for unskilled workers (“guest worker programs”).  
The H visa program,31 for instance, contains labor market tests.  Their 
purpose is to ensure that there is not a surplus of foreign workers that would 
negatively affect domestic workers.32 
Along with labor market demands, immigration law has acknowledged 
the centrality of workplace issues through the formal inclusion of 
workplace protections for foreign laborers within immigration policy.  This 
was the case for the first notable guest worker program, which ran from 
191733 until 1922 as a national emergency response to labor shortages 
during World War I.34  It was an exception to the restrictive Immigration 
Act of 1917 and contained “elaborate rules” to protect both United States 
and Mexican workers.35  The “Bracero Program,” which ran from 1942 
until 1964,36 similarly illustrates the formal inclusion of workplace 
protections in an immigration law.  A bilateral agreement between the 
United States and Mexico, the Bracero Program was originally created as a 
 
 28. See NGAI, supra note 25, at 19. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See generally Francisco E. Balderrama & Raymond Rodriguez, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: 
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S (rev. ed. 2006) (describing the repatriation program). 
 31. The H visa program started in 1952 but was not widely used until after the Bracero Program 
ended in 1964.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006); Alice J. Baker, Agricultural Guestworker 
Programs in the United States, 10 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 79, 86 (2004). 
 32. See U.S. Migrant Worker Law, supra note 12, at 130 (“The labor market tests, which are not 
very rigorous, are intended to ensure that the influx of foreign labor does not displace or adversely affect 
the wages and working conditions of domestic workers.”). 
 33. The U.S. encouraged laborers from China and Japan before 1917 as well.  See Lauren Gilbert, 
Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair: Legisprudential and Historic Perspectives on the AgJobs Bill of 
2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 417, 425-27 (2005) (describing the move away from Chinese and Japanese 
labor and toward Mexican labor with the Immigration Act of 1917). 
 34. Prior to this time, the use of guest workers was infrequent.  See NGAI, supra note 25, at 137 
(“The United States had outlawed foreign contract labor in 1885” because it was viewed as “the 
antithesis of free labor, upon which democracy depended.”). 
 35. Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Guestworker Programs: Lessons from the Past and Warnings for the 
Future 1 (2004), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back304.pdf.  See NGAI, supra note 25, at 
19 (referring to the 1917 law as “the most stringent immigration law to date.”). 
 36. Guest workers from the British West Indies also came during this period.  See NGAI, supra 
note 25, at 138.  The British West Indies program required employers to pay the travel and recruitment 
costs of the guest workers.  See Briggs, supra note 35, at 3. 
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wartime emergency measure to deal with labor shortages.37  It required 
expansive protections for workers concerning wages, housing, meals, and 
transportation to the work site.38  Under the Bracero Program, for instance, 
employers were required to pay for employee transportation from their 
homes in Mexico to their workplaces in the United States.39 
Both the current guest worker program and the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)40 similarly include formal workplace 
protections for employees.  Guest worker programs require employers to 
pay a certain level of wages and provide specified benefits to their guest 
workers.41  The H visa agricultural guest worker program, for example, 
requires employers to offer housing to guest workers at no cost.42  
Moreover, IRCA, the federal government’s workplace-based immigration 
enforcement strategy, has an anti-discrimination provision which prohibits 
employers from discriminating against guest workers based on their 
national origin or citizenship status.43  It also appropriates funding for the 
U.S. Department of Labor to enhance enforcement of federal wage and hour 
protections on behalf of undocumented employees.44  In fact, IRCA’s 
legislative history is replete with examples of Congress’s intent—albeit 
 
 37. Until 1951, the Program existed “through a series of agreements between the United States 
and Mexico” until it was included in statutory law in 1951.  Catherine L. Merino, Compromising 
Immigration Reform: The Creation of a Vulnerable Subclass, 98 YALE L. J. 409, 420 n.78 (1988).  See 
also Kati L. Griffith, Globalizing U.S. Employment Statutes Through Foreign Law Influence: Mexico’s 
Foreign Employer Provision and Recruited Mexican Workers, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 383, 418 
n.146 (2008) [hereafter Globalizing U.S. Employment Statutes] (describing the Bracero Program’s legal 
basis over time); Howard R. Rosenberg, Snapshots in a Farm Labor Tradition, 3 LAB. MGMT. Dec. 1 
(1993), available at http://are.berkeley.edu/~howardrr/pubs/lmd/html/winterspring_93/snapshots.html 
(same). 
 38. See NGAI, supra note 25, at 140 (describing braceros’ rights and the bi-national investigation 
procedures intended to vindicate those rights). 
 39. See Globalizing U.S. Employment Statutes, supra note 37, at 416-18 (describing this 
transportation protection during various phases of the Bracero Program). 
 40. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 41. U.S. Migrant Worker Law, supra note 12, at 136 (“An H-2A employer is required to pay the 
highest of the minimum wage, prevailing hourly wage, and the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR)” 
and “an H-2B employer must promise to pay the prevailing wage for the occupation.”); Andrew J. 
Elmore, Egalitarianism and Exclusion: U.S. Guest Worker Programs and a Non-subordination 
Approach to the Labor-Based Admission of Non-professional Foreign Nationals, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 
521, 546 (2007) (describing the worker protections contained in the H-2B Program); See Baker, supra 
note 31, at 89-91 (describing the worker protections contained in the H-2A program). 
 42. See Ruth Ellen Wasem, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33977, IMMIGRATION OF FOREIGN 
WORKERS: LABOR MARKET TESTS AND PROTECTIONS 12-14 (2007). 
 43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1). 
 44. IRCA § 111(d). 
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often not realized in practice—to support workplace law policy goals within 
an immigration statute.45 
Congress’s enactment of IRCA in 1986 further intensified the 
relationship between immigration law and workplace law46—and therefore 
the relationship between immigration advocacy and labor advocacy—by 
bringing immigration enforcement directly into the workplace.47  Located 
within the Immigration and Nationality Act,48 IRCA is undoubtedly an 
immigration law.  Similar to workplace law, however, it targets the 
workplace as the site of enforcement and, as described above, contains 
explicit workplace protections for employees.  IRCA imposes civil and, in 
more serious cases, criminal sanctions on employers who knowingly 
employ undocumented immigrants and on employees who knowingly use 
fraudulent documents to gain employment.49  It charges employers with 
verifying the immigration status of their prospective employees through the 
I-9 verification process or the E-Verify electronic verification system.50  It 
thereby places a good deal of immigration enforcement into private hands, 
particularly the hands of employers.51  IRCA is enforced through 
government audits of employer records and workplace-based immigration 
raids.52  Acknowledging the intersection of IRCA’s workplace-based 
 
 45. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 21,29993 (1986).  See generally Kati L. Griffith, ICE Was Not 
Meant to be Cold: The Case for Civil Rights Monitoring of Immigration Enforcement at the Workplace, 
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1137, 1145-54 (2011) [hereinafter ICE Was Not Meant to be Cold] (citing IRCA 
legislative history which shows Congress’s intent to protect employees’ workplace protections). 
 46. See Discovering ‘Immployment’ Law, supra note 11, at 402-06 (describing the various ways 
that IRCA is a “hybrid” because it implicates both immigration law and workplace law). 
 47. For many decades, U.S. immigration law ignored the workplace as a site of enforcement and, 
instead, focused on “the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment 
of aliens lawfully in the country.”  De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976).  However, in 1986 
“IRCA ‘forcefully’ made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to ‘the policy of 
immigration law.’”  Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (emphasis 
added) (quoting and citing INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 
(1991)). 
 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1537. 
 49. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Lee, supra note 13, at 1104-05 (focusing “on . . . one particularly problematic set of 
immigration screeners: the workplace and our nation’s employers”); Immigration Enforcement Versus 
Employment Law Enforcement, supra note 12, at 306 (“With the passage of the IRCA, Congress 
determined that employers would become both targets and allies in border control and enforcement 
activities.”).  IRCA does not make it illegal for an undocumented worker to engage in work, but it does 
impose sanctions on employees who knowingly use fraudulent documents to gain employment.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1324c(a). 
 52. Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 
U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 896-98 (2008) [hereinafter A New “U”].  See also Jayesh M. Rathod, Beyond the 
“Chilling Effect”: Immigrant Worker Behavior and the Regulation of Occupational Safety & Health, 14 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 267, 271-72 (2010) (“When enforcement actions do occur, they can take the 
form of pre-planned workplace raids, or, as the Obama administration has preferred of late, behind-the-
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immigration enforcement and workplace law enforcement, federal 
immigration and labor agencies recently signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding.53  However, formal inclusions of employee protections 
within immigration law historically and workplace-based immigration 
enforcement are not the only reasons to consider immigration law as a labor 
issue. 
B. Labor-Related Critiques of Immigration Law 
Previous scholarship, which often critiques immigration law from a 
workers’ rights perspective, also bolsters the view that immigration and 
labor advocacy are intertwined.54  Indeed, the main critiques of guest 
worker programs have focused on labor issues.  They identify employers’ 
mistreatment of guest workers despite formal legal protections and 
sometimes highlight unfair labor market competition between domestic 
workers and guest workers.  According to one scholar, for instance, the 
worker protections in the 1917 guest worker program were simply not 
enforced.55  Moreover, some critics claim that a continuation of the program 
until 1922 was unnecessary, “but that greedy employers wanted the 
program to continue so that they could continue to tap a cheap source of 
docile workers.”56  Similarly, scholars contend that the Bracero Program’s 
 
scenes audits of employment records that result in the termination of employees.”); Kim, supra note 12, 
at 268 (describing immigration authorities’ “heightened worksite enforcement” through workplace 
raids). 
 53. See Revised Memorandum of Understanding Between the Dept’s of Homeland Security and 
Labor Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites (March 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/HispanicLaborForce/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf. 
 54. Immigration law’s negative effects on employees’ workplace protections are perhaps not all 
that surprising given that immigration law and workplace law have “sometimes contradictory legislative 
impulses.” Catherine Fisk & Michael Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: 
Labor Rights without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 400 (Laura 
J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005).  Immigration law commonly “privileges legal immigrants 
over undocumented ones,” id. at 399, and workplace law “views the equal and wide application of the 
rights of employees as necessary” to avoid the expansion of an easily-exploitable subclass of workers.  
U.S. Migrant Worker Law, supra note 12, at 129.  See also Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants 
in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 345, 348 (2001) (referring to IRCA and noting that the “overlap of immigration and labor laws in 
the employment setting highlights the tension between the nation’s broad national labor goals and 
restrictionist immigration policy”).  Moreover, immigration law and workplace law have “contrasting 
enforcement mechanisms.” Kim, supra note 12, at 248.  Immigration law is “largely enforced by public 
bodies” and workplace laws are largely enforced “by private actors” via employee-led complaints. Id.; 
Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration Law: One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 136 (2002). 
 55. See Briggs, Jr., supra note 35, at 1. 
 56. Id. at 2. 
2. GRIFFITH LEE COMPLETE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2012  6:17:08 PM 
2012 IMMIGRATION ADVOCACY AS LABOR ADVOCACY 85 
 
elaborate workplace protections “were either ignored or circumvented.”57  
According to some critics, the program depressed wages in certain regions 
of the United States and reduced the duration of employment for domestic 
workers.58 
Moreover, the existing H-2 guest worker programs, while intended to 
be an improvement from the guest worker programs of the past, have 
continued to face criticism that they narrow employees’ workplace 
protections in practice. These programs are considered problematic because 
“workers are totally dependent on their employers.”59  This is the case, at 
least in part, because under no circumstances are guest workers allowed to 
switch employers once they are in the United States.  They must return to 
their country of origin if they leave the employment of their sponsoring 
employers.  Critics argue that tying low-wage H-2 workers to a single 
employer restricts their ability to complain when their rights as workers are 
violated.60  In accordance with the criticisms of past guest worker programs, 
critics contend that the H-2 program has had damaging effects on 
employees’ workplace protections, with some likening the program to 
“indentured servitude.”61 
 
 57. Id.  See also Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor 
Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2003) (“Braceros were really indentured servants.  They were 
routinely paid as little as twenty cents an hour, subjected to hazardous working conditions, and fired if 
they dared so much as to speak with labor organizers. They were promised pensions and benefits that 
they never received.”); Philip L. Martin & Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Mexican Guest 
Workers, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 117, 122 (2001) (stating that there was “increasing evidence of abuses of 
bracero workers by employers” in the 1950s). 
 58. Briggs, Jr., supra note 35, at 2-4 (referring to the downward pressure on wages and other 
negative effects on jobs).  See also NGAI, supra note 25, at 143 (“The [negative] effect of imported 
contract labor on domestic wages was unmistakable.”).  For other labor-related critiques of the program, 
see KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION AND THE I.N.S. 
(1992); ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY, AN ACCOUNT OF 
THE MANAGED MIGRATION OF MEXICAN FARM WORKERS IN CALIFORNIA, 1942-1960 (1964). 
 59. Briggs, Jr., supra note 35 at 4.  See also Emily B. White, Note, How We Treat Our Guests: 
Mobilizing Employment Discrimination Protections in a Guest Worker Program, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 269, 278 (2007) (referring to H-2A workers as “easy to coerce.”); Arthur N. Read, Learning 
from the Past: Designing Effective Worker Protections for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 16 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 423, 431 (2007) (“The ability of employers to blacklist workers who 
make complaints, and to deny re-entry with temporary worker visas, is a critical flaw of the H-2 
program because it vests employers with an overwhelming ability to control workforces subject to 
recruitment.”). 
 60. White, supra note 59, at 279 (making this criticism in the H-2A context); Read, supra note 59, 
at 430-32 (making this criticism in the H-2B context); Maria Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor 
and the Thirteenth Amendment: Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 938-39 
(2007) (stating that guest workers must be able to stay in the U.S. during the whole term of their visas, 
even if they no longer work for their sponsoring employer, to accord with the Thirteen Amendment). 
 61. See, e.g., Bryce W. Ashby, Note, Indentured Guests - How the H-2A and H-2B Temporary 
Guest Worker Programs Create the Conditions for Indentured Servitude and Why Upfront 
Reimbursement for Guest Workers’ Transportation, Visa, and Recruitment Costs is the Solution, 38 U. 
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Labor-related critiques of IRCA are also bountiful.62  Indeed, most 
observers see the interplay between immigration law—IRCA—and 
employees’ workplace protections as destructive from a workplace law 
perspective.  While IRCA contains some employee protections and 
immigration law has the policy goal of enhancing the working conditions 
and wages of all workers,63 commentators, advocates, and workplace law 
scholars have convincingly argued that, in practice, IRCA and U.S. 
Supreme Court interpretations of IRCA have often been in conflict with 
many of the fundamental employee protections that workplace law 
provides. 
Many critics argue that IRCA has deleterious effects on employee 
protections during union organizing efforts and other types of workers’ 
collective activity.64  This critique is largely based on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of IRCA’s relationship to the NLRA in Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds v. NLRB.65  In 2002, the Hoffman Court concluded that IRCA 
restricts an undocumented employee’s access to an NLRA backpay remedy, 
which is payment for work the employee would have performed if the 
employer had not illegally fired the employee for union organizing.66  In 
Hoffman, it was undisputed that the employer illegally fired an 
 
MEM. L. REV. 893, 895 (2008) (noting that the “de-facto indentured servitude that these workers face is 
all too common among H-2A and H-2B guest workers”). Baker, supra note 31, at 98 (“The H-2A 
program, therefore, has not succeeded in preserving jobs, wages, or working conditions for domestic 
farmworkers.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 12, at 252 (describing “the goals of immigration enforcement” as 
“supersed[ing] those of civil rights enforcement”); Annie Decker, Comment, Suspending Employers’ 
Immigration-Related Duties During Labor Disputes: A Statutory Proposal, 115 YALE L. J. 2193, 2193 
(2006) (“Immigration and labor law can be uncomfortable bedfellows.”). 
 63. See Kennedy & Cowan, supra note 3, at 102. 
 64. See Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement, supra note 12, at 305 
n.1 (“[T]he Supreme Court interpreted immigration enforcement policy goals as essentially trumping the 
enforcement goals against unfair labor practices in labor cases”); Elizabeth J. Kennedy, The Invisible 
Corner: Expanding Workplace Rights for Female Day Laborers, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 126, 
143 n.95 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in [Hoffman] further limited unauthorized workers’ 
right to an effective remedy for violation of their freedom of association”); Rathod, supra note 52, at 
269 (“[Hoffman] limited relief available to undocumented workers under federal labor law.”); Cameron, 
supra note 57, at 2 (“The decision effectively gives domestic employers carte blanche to hire at the 
lowest wages possible the mostly Latino immigrants who now form the backbone of our economy, and 
to get rid of them at the first sign they might demand a better deal through collective bargaining—all 
without fear of being called to account for violating federal labor law.”). 
 65. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 66. Id. at 147-49.  For a critique of this decision, see Ghost Workers, supra note 10, at 739 (“In 
deciding Hoffman, the Court had an opportunity to reconcile immigration and labor law in a way that 
would benefit all workers, but it instead highlighted the ineffectiveness of immigration law, and labor 
law’s inability to protect all workers.”).  See also id. at 765 (discussing Hoffman and stating that it “is an 
example of how the privileging of one body of law (immigration) over another (labor law) can be 
detrimental to the interests of immigrants, workers of color, and, ultimately, all workers”). 
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undocumented employee for engaging in a union-organizing drive.67  The 
Court determined, however, that providing the undocumented employee 
with NLRA backpay to remedy the employer’s NLRA violation would 
condone prior violations of immigration law and would encourage future 
violations.68  The Hoffman dissent contended that failing to award NLRA 
backpay would further weaken the NLRA’s protections.69  In this way, 
“[t]he decision represented a collision at the crossroads of two bodies of 
law—labor law and immigration law”70—and has served as a catalyst “to 
understand the interrelatedness of immigration and labor laws to a greater 
extent.”71 
Although Hoffman solely addressed IRCA’s effects on the NLRA, 
scholars have exposed that IRCA, as interpreted by some courts, has had 
negative effects on the remedies available pursuant to other workplace 
laws72 and on employee-led enforcement of workplace protections.  Indeed, 
following the post-Hoffman “cascade of litigation,”73 courts have been 
unwilling to reinstate undocumented employees back into their jobs even if 
they have been fired in violation of a workplace law.74  Moreover, a few 
 
 67. In 1984, the Supreme Court in Sure Tan had concluded that undocumented workers are NLRA 
employees.  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984). 
 68. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150.  See also Ghost Workers, supra note 10, at 739 (“Critical legal 
scholars have powerfully argued that this fragmentary approach to legal interpretation has adversely 
affected people of color in a variety of different legal contexts.”). 
 69. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153-60. 
 70. Ghost Workers, supra note 10, at 739. 
 71. Maria L. Ontiveros, Labor Union Coalition Challenges to Governmental Action: Defending 
the Civil Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 134 (2009).  See also Michael C. 
Duff, Embracing Paradox: Three Problems the NLRB Must Confront to Resist Further Erosion of Labor 
Rights in the Expanding Immigrant Workplace, 30 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 133 (2009) 
[hereinafter Embracing Paradox] (discussing Hoffman’s impact on the NLRA’s protection of bargaining 
in good faith over mandatory subjects). 
 72. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 
AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1363-64 (2009) (noting the decline in remedies and stating that “women in New 
Jersey who are unauthorized immigrants can no longer recover backpay for pregnancy discrimination.  
The same is true for sexual harassment claims in Texas, workplace injury claims in Michigan, and wage 
retaliation claims in Illinois.”).  Id. at 1370 (“Actions outside the courts suggest that Title VII remains 
somewhat vulnerable to remedial losses . . . .”).  But see Cameron, supra note 57, at 5 (“The ill effects 
of Hoffman will be confined mostly to the ever shrinking world of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).”).  Many courts have kept Hoffman’s effects on employment law remedies minimal.  In fact, at 
least one district court did not allow an employer, in the midst of a Title VII case, to suddenly comply 
with his IRCA requirements by requesting immigration documentation from his employees.  As the 
judge put it, “the court is not persuaded by [the employer’s] sudden declaration of patriotic motivation” 
to comply with IRCA after his employees sued him under Title VII.  EEOC v. City of Joliet, 239 F.R.D. 
490, 493 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 73. Rathod, supra note 52, at 273.  See also id. (“Hoffman Plastic Compounds tacitly invited 
employers to test the significance of immigration status in other areas of employment and labor law.”). 
 74. See Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 497, 505 (2004) (stating that reinstatement is no longer available to an undocumented worker post-
IRCA unless the worker gains work authorization). 
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courts have scaled back the remedies available to victims of employment 
law violations.75  In one Title VII case, for instance, the federal district court 
viewed Hoffman as applicable to all backpay remedies, regardless of which 
workplace law was at issue.76  Along with these “Hoffman effects,” critics 
contend that IRCA has fostered disincentives for workers who may 
otherwise come forward to expose workplace law abuses.77  Employees’ 
fear of coming forward is particularly problematic in a system such as ours 
that relies so heavily on private employee complaints to regulate 
employees’ workplace conditions, rather than government-initiated 
inquiries.78 
Given the historical intersection of immigration law and labor issues, 
and the labor-related critiques of immigration law, immigration law is a 
labor issue.  Therefore, advocacy related to immigration law should be 
considered labor advocacy.  Part II further builds our proposed 
immigration-advocacy-as-labor-advocacy framework by illustrating that the 
 
 75. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. ACL Farms, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125885, at *10-11 (E.D. 
Wash. Nov. 12, 2010) (“This court concludes immigration status is relevant to determination of actual 
damages [under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act] and does not place an 
undue burden on those Plaintiffs who elect to pursue such damages.  In order to avoid any chilling of 
Plaintiffs’ efforts to pursue liability and statutory damages, however, the court will bifurcate the case so 
that liability and statutory damages are resolved in the initial phase.”).  See Rebecca Smith, Human 
Rights at Home: Human Rights as an Organizing and Legal Tool in Low-Wage Worker Communities, 3 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 285, 293 (2007) (referring to Hoffman’s effects and stating that “some state courts 
have refused to accord undocumented workers compensation for wages lost due to work-related injuries 
and on-the-job discrimination”). 
 76. See Colindres v. Quietflex Mfg., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27982 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004). 
 77. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) (refusing discovery into 
immigration status during the liability phase of a post-Hoffman Title VII case and describing barriers to 
coming forward which affect documented and undocumented workers); Discovering ‘Immployment’ 
Law, supra note 11, at 437-40 (describing the existing case law and literature on this issue); Jennifer 
Gordon, Editorial, Workers Without Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, at A27 (“Raids terrorize 
immigrants but do not make them go home.”); Kim, supra note 12, at 258 (“The constant threat of 
deportation alienates workers with precarious immigration status from access to justice for workplace 
violations.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2069 (2008) 
(stating that to the “constant threat can make workers’ lives precarious—always reminding them that 
they are powerless”); Fear of Discovery, supra note 12, at 46 (“Without an effective strategy for 
answering the status-based question born of Hoffman, immigrants will continue to opt out of civil 
litigation, unwilling to assert even the strongest claims for workplace violations.”); A New “U,” supra 
note 52, at 914-35 (describing how the use of the U visa could make employees feel safer, thereby 
increasing the reporting of workplace law abuses); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to 
Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003) (stating that undocumented immigrant workers are unlikely 
“to report their harsh working conditions for fear they will attract the attention of immigration 
authorities”); Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for 
Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2183 (1994) (describing how the fear 
of deportation further reduces the likelihood that immigrant workers will complain about abuses in the 
workplace).  See Rathod, supra note 52 (contending that more research needs to be done about the wide 
array of circumstances that affect immigrant worker behavior). 
 78. Discovering ‘Immployment’ Law, supra note 11, at 431-36 (describing FLSA and Title VII 
legislative history showing the dependence on employee-led complaints). 
2. GRIFFITH LEE COMPLETE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2012  6:17:08 PM 
2012 IMMIGRATION ADVOCACY AS LABOR ADVOCACY 89 
 
NLRA could protect a broad swath of employees’ collective immigration 
advocacy efforts.  In other words, a good deal of immigration advocacy is 
protected labor advocacy. 
II. 
IMMIGRATION ADVOCACY AS PROTECTED LABOR ADVOCACY 
In this Part, we further establish that immigration advocacy is labor 
advocacy by showing that employees’ collective immigration advocacy 
efforts fall within the NLRA’s broad legal protections of employees’ 
collective activity.  Immigration law, therefore, is a labor issue not only 
because of immigration law history and because of the labor-based critiques 
of immigration law described in Part I, but also because the relationship 
between immigration law and labor law can sometimes lead to a more 
expansive view of legal protections for employees. 
Unlike NLRA protections that relate to employees who are engaged in 
disputes with their employers at particular workplaces, the NLRA’s 
protection of employees’ advocacy efforts operates at a broader level and 
encompasses collective employee efforts to affect workplace issues at the 
municipal, state, and national levels (“advocacy,” “labor advocacy” or 
“employee advocacy”).  In this Part, we describe the overarching legal 
standard for determining when the NLRA protects employees’ collective 
advocacy which aims to achieve broader policy goals. 
To demonstrate the NLRA’s expansive protection of employees’ 
immigration advocacy from employer interference, we then present three 
types of NLRA-protected advocacy messages or “frames,” gleaned from the 
relevant case law in other contexts.  Frames are the ways that individuals 
justify the need for legal reform or a change in governmental actions with 
respect to a particular issue.  We then apply these frames to labor unions’ 
recent advocacy statements about immigration reform.  The analysis uses 
the statements of the two main labor congresses, the AFL-CIO and Change 
to Win, as examples because of their active involvement in recent 
immigration advocacy efforts.  While not all local unions or employees 
agree with the views of the two congresses, the statements of the congresses 
provide a good indicator of a significant portion of the labor movement 
(“labor”).  Finally, we describe advocacy frames that do not fall within the 
NLRA’s protection to show the outer boundaries of the NLRA’s protection 
of immigration advocacy as labor advocacy. 
A. The Overarching Legal Standard for Protected Labor Advocacy 
One of the three crucial requirements for NLRA protection of 
advocacy relates to the framing of employees’ advocacy efforts.  While we 
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focus exclusively on the framing issue, the other two requirements merit 
brief mention here because they are potentially relevant in all NLRB 
advocacy cases.  First, employees can lose NLRA protection if the NLRB 
views the employer’s action as justified79—for example, employer firings of 
immigration rally participants for their unexcused absences from work80—
or the employees’ communication is “so disloyal, reckless or maliciously 
untrue that it loses the Act’s protection.”81  Second, the NLRA requires 
employees to be engaged in some form of “concerted activity.”82  Concerted 
activity includes activity intended to instigate group action and activity that 
is engaged in “with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely 
by and on behalf of the employee himself.”83  Because these two NLRA 
requirements have been addressed by other scholars, this Article will not 
address these issues.  Instead, the remainder of the Article focuses on the 
NLRA’s third requirement—that employees’ advocacy is framed in such a 
way that it is for employees’ “mutual aid or protection.”84 
The Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB 
established that the key inquiry for determining whether employee 
 
 79. See, e.g., Fun Striders, Inc. v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding employer had 
a legitimate business justification in preserving the peace in light of the employees’ advocacy of “violent 
revolution,” “destruction of all bosses,” and “armed revolution of all the working class”). 
 80. In a 2006 Advice Memorandum from the NLRB’s Associate General Counsel, the NLRB 
noted that employees can lose NLRA protection if they “miss[] work without permission simply to 
participate in” immigration rallies.  Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, 
to Robert W. Chester, Reg’l Dir., Region 18, NLRB, regarding Reliable Maint., Case 18-CA-18119, at 
*1 (October 31, 2006).  In this context, the memorandum boldly went on to state that “economic 
pressure directed at an employer that has no control over the demonstration’s subject matter is also not 
protected.”  Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Robert W. Chester, 
Reg’l Dir., Region 18, NLRB, regarding Reliable Maint., Case 18-CA-18119, at *1 (October 31, 2006). 
 81. Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832, 834 (1987). 
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006); Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 n.14 (1978) (“Congress modeled 
the language of § 7 after that found in § 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act . . . which declares that it is the 
public policy of the United States that workers ‘shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion 
of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of . . . representatives or in self-organization or 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection 
. . . .’”).  See id. (“This section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act expresses Congress’ recognition of the 
‘right of wage earners to organize and to act jointly in questions affecting wages, conditions of labor, 
and the welfare of labor generally . . . . ”’) (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted). 
 83. Meyers Industries Inc. (“Meyers I”), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (expressing that the 
activity must “be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on 
behalf of the employee himself”); Meyers Industries Inc. (“Meyers II”), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 884 (1986) 
(stating that the Act “requires some linkage to group action in order for conduct to be deemed 
‘concerted’ within the meaning of Section 7”); Pennant Foods Co., 347 N.L.R.B. 460 (2006) (reviewing 
the history of Meyers I and II, and applying Court and Board law to find an employee’s actions 
concerted, despite the fact that he had acted alone during some portion of the concerted activity). 
 84. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection . . . .”). 
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advocacy is for “mutual aid or protection” is whether the framing of 
employee advocacy to influence judicial, executive, or legislative bodies 
sufficiently relates to “employees’ interests as employees.”85  In Eastex, the 
Court considered whether two parts of a union newsletter were protected 
under the NLRA.86  One part encouraged employees to contact their 
legislators to oppose the incorporation of Texas’s existing right-to-work 
statute into the state constitution.  Another part criticized President Nixon’s 
veto of an increase in the federal minimum wage and urged employees to 
register to vote.87  The employer prohibited the union from distributing this 
newsletter during non-working time in non-working areas of the workplace.  
The Eastex Court concluded that the employer’s prohibition violated the 
NLRA because the distribution of the newsletter constituted protected labor 
advocacy.88  According to the Court, all aspects of the newsletter were 
reasonably related to “employees’ interests as employees” and therefore fell 
within the NLRA’s mutual aid or protection clause.  This was the case even 
though the advocacy did not directly relate to employment relations at this 
particular workplace.89 
While the Eastex Court set forth a broad legal standard for determining 
whether the NLRA protects employee advocacy to influence judicial, 
 
 85. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567. 
 86. Id. at 558.  The newsletter had four sections. The first and fourth sections urged employees to 
support the union and union solidarity.  Id. at 559. There was no dispute as to whether such literature 
was protected by the NLRA  Id. at 561. 
 87. Id. at 577-78. 
 88. For instance, the Court reasoned that the newsletter’s request that employees write to their 
legislators to oppose the constitutional incorporation of a right-to-work statute was protected because 
union security is “central to the union concept of strength through solidarity” and “a mandatory subject 
of bargaining in other than right-to-work states.”  Id. at 569. 
 89. Id. at 556, 561-63.  In noting that “mutual aid or protection” is broader than “self-
organization” or “collective bargaining,” the Eastex Court pointed to a number of cases in which the 
NLRB had protected conduct outside of that dealing with specific issues at the employees’ own facility, 
or on behalf of the employer’s own employees. Id. at 565. This included advocacy before a broad level 
of political institutions, including appeals “to administrative and judicial forums” as well as legislators 
to protect their interests as employees.  See id. at 566 n.16 (citing a string of NLRB cases for this 
proposition).  See also Bateman, supra note 19, at 43 (noting that advocacy can still be protected even 
when it does not focus on employees’ own working conditions).  Demonstrating the wide scope of the 
NLRA’s “mutual aid or protection” clause, the Eastex Court rejected the employer’s argument that in 
order to fall under the protection of Section 7, the conduct must relate to a specific dispute between 
employees and their own employer “over an issue which the employer has the right or power to affect.” 
Eastex, 437 U.S. at 563, 564-65.  See also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) 
(concluding that employees did not need to make specific demands on an employer to receive protection 
under the NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2006) (defining “labor dispute” broadly as “any controversy 
concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation 
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of 
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and 
employee”) (emphasis added). 
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executive, or legislative bodies, the Court did limit it to some extent.  The 
Court stated that: 
[S]ome concerted activity bears a less immediate relationship to employees’ 
interests as employees than other such activity.  We may assume that at 
some point the relationship becomes so attenuated that an activity cannot 
fairly be deemed to come within the mutual aid or protection clause.90 
However, the Eastex Court refused to further delineate the scope of 
labor advocacy that is protected under the NLRA’s mutual aid or protection 
clause.91  Instead, it concluded that the NLRB should consider the scope of 
protected labor advocacy on a case-by-case basis.92 
In the wake of Eastex, the NLRB considers the “purpose and subject 
matter of the advocacy” to determine whether employees’ advocacy efforts 
are protected under Section 7.93  It requires “a direct nexus between 
employment-related concerns and the specific issues that are the subject of 
the advocacy.”94  While drawing the line between protected and unprotected 
labor advocacy has been difficult95 and there has been some inconsistency 
in the NLRB’s jurisprudence,96 the NLRB’s case law illustrates a 
continuum of protected and unprotected labor advocacy.97 
 
 90. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567-68 (emphasis added). 
 91. See Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 
685, 691 (1985) (stating that the Eastex Court “failed to decide how much action is protected regarding 
even those political issues that the Court believes are closely linked to workers’ interests as 
employees”). 
 92. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 568-70. 
 93. Meisburg, supra note 20. 
 94. Id.  Similarly, the NLRB requires that the content of each communication be “sufficiently 
related to the . . . terms and conditions of employment.”  Five Star Transportation, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 
42, 44 (2007).  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated, employee advocacy to 
legislators that “bears a sufficiently close relationship to the employees’ wages and working conditions” 
is protected by NLRA Section 7.  Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 95. See, e.g., Meisburg, supra note 20, at 1 (“The important question of where, and on what basis, 
to draw the line between protected concerted activity and unprotected political activity can be a difficult 
one.”). 
 96. Compare Eastex, 437 U.S. at 577-78 (protecting union statements asking employees to vote 
for labor’s “friends”) with Caterpillar, Inc. and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 1997 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 192, at *30-31 (1997) (finding a 
Clinton/Gore sticker on a toolbox to be “purely political”).  See also Kennedy & Cowan, supra note 3, at 
112 (noting the “tension between Eastex’s recognition that concerted employee activity is broader than 
the individual employment relationship and the effort in some portions of the Act to confine labor 
relations to that specific employment relationship”). 
 97. See, e.g., Bateman, supra note 19, at 54 (citing Firestone Steel Products Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 
826, 826 (1979) and stating that the NLRB was trying to locate “union ‘political’ communication along 
a continuum, placing at one end literature dominantly aimed at inducing votes for specific candidates, 
and at the other, literature designed principally to educate employees on political issues that may 
impinge on their employment conditions.”).  See also Local 174 International Union v. NLRB, 645 F.2d. 
1151, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[T]he Board states that it is attempting to range union ‘political’ 
communication along a continuum, placing at one end literature dominantly aimed at inducing votes for 
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On one side of the continuum are advocacy frames that are 
traditionally considered protected, such as labor advocacy to gain 
workplace rights, improve wages and working conditions, and enhance job 
opportunities and security.98  On the other side are unprotected advocacy 
frames, which advocate primarily on behalf of a specific political candidate 
or political party, without a sufficient connection to employees’ interests as 
employees.99  If advocacy statements include both protected and 
unprotected frames—sometimes referred to as “mixed material”—the 
NLRB determines which frames dominate.100  According to the NLRB, 
when advocacy statements are set forth using primarily job-related frames, 
they will be protected against employer interference during employees’ 
non-work time, in non-work areas.101  If unprotected frames dominate, the 
NLRA will not protect the advocacy.102  The following subsections draw 
 
specific candidates, and at the other, literature designed principally to educate employees on political 
issues that may impinge on their employment conditions. We find this approach to be consistent with the 
Supreme Court's statements in Eastex that § 7 protection may depend upon the object or context of the 
activity.”).  For a discussion of another continuum between NLRA protected and unprotected activity, 
see Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 
YALE J. ON REG. 355, 357 (1990) (describing picketing as lying on a “continuum [between Section 7 
protection and Section 8 prohibition] which Congress has regulated in its entirety”). 
 98. See, e.g., Kenworth Truck Co., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 497, 501 (1999) (protecting labor advocacy 
to repeal a statute substantially limiting available employee benefits in Ohio); Red Food Stores, Inc., 296 
N.L.R.B. 450, 450-53 (1989) (protecting labor advocacy against a foreign-owned employer which 
alleged that the employer paid inferior benefits and wages). 
 99. See, e.g., Bateman, supra note 19, at 56 (“The current decisions seem to suggest that if placed 
on a continuum, those activities that would be deemed not within the scope of section 7 would be those 
that merely tout a political candidate or party in an election.  At the other end of the spectrum activity 
that would seem to almost always garner section 7 coverage are direct appeals by unions and employees 
to legislators over issues of general workplace concern.”). 
 100. See Memorandum from General Counsel, NLRB, to Samuel M. Kaynard, Reg’l Dir., Region 
29, NLRB, regarding Eagle Electric Mfg. Co., Case 29-CA-10504, 29-CA-15012-1, 29-CA-15012-3, at 
*6-7, 1983 WL 29378 at *2 (November 3, 1983) (recommending that support for a union activist facing 
deportation was primarily aimed at protesting the deportation of a Mexican political activist who sought 
asylum and that the otherwise protected labor advocacy was “de minimus” when compared with the 
literature in its entirety). 
 101. Samsonite Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. 343, 346 (1973). 
 102. In Mead Corp., a union distributed a handbill that stated in the top half of the flyer, “AL 
GORE DOES NOT WANT TO TAKE AWAY YOUR GUN, BUT GEORGE W. BUSH WANTS TO 
TAKE AWAY YOUR UNION.”  The bottom half of the flyer cited several newspaper editorials that 
discussed Bush’s position on several general labor concerns, including right-to-work laws, overtime pay, 
minimum wage, prevailing wage and the privatization of government jobs. The handbill contained an 
insignia of the union’s nationwide campaign to educate workers on how to vote.  The NLRB concluded 
that the distribution of the handbill was unprotected labor advocacy, finding the content of the handbill 
to be too “remotely related” to employees’ interests as employees to be for “mutual aid or protection.”  
Mead Corp., 2001 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 429, at *7-10 (2001). In Firestone the employer refused to allow the 
union to distribute literature during non-working time and in non-working areas.  The literature 
supported candidates for the Michigan Supreme Court, Governor of the State of Michigan, and the U.S. 
Senate.  The NLRB concluded that the literature did not make any connection to employment concerns 
and instead focused on individual candidates for office.  Firestone Steel Products Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 826, 
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from existing case law to describe each of the protected and unprotected 
advocacy frames and to apply these frames to labor’s recent immigration 
advocacy statements.  The analysis illuminates the broad, albeit 
circumscribed, scope of the NLRA’s protection of immigration advocacy as 
labor advocacy. 
B. Protected Frames 
The NLRA has protected advocacy frames related to a variety of policy 
arenas as long as the issue is sufficiently framed as a (1) workplace rights, 
(2) wages and working conditions, or (3) job opportunities and job security 
issue.  Applying the existing case law to recent trade union advocacy 
statements about immigration reform shows the NLRA’s potential to 
broadly protect labor’s framing of the issue. 
i. The Workplace Rights Frame 
Given the NLRB’s post-Eastex case law, advocacy that broadly frames 
the issue as a workplace rights issue falls within the NLRA’s protective 
scope.  The NLRB’s Kenworth Truck Company., Inc.103 case, which 
involved employee advocacy on behalf of increased workers’ compensation 
rights, illustrates that the NLRB has protected employees’ advocacy on 
behalf of political issues when the issue was framed as a workplace rights 
issue.  In Kenworth, an employee agreed to distribute an AFL-CIO-
sponsored handbill among employees for the purpose of repealing a statute 
that reduced the benefits available for workplace injuries pursuant to Ohio’s 
Workmen’s Compensation system.104  Although there was no reference to a 
labor concern at any specific employer, the NLRB found that Eastex was 
controlling and that the handbill was protected labor advocacy.  The NLRB 
stated that “the handbilling overtly was accomplished by union members 
for a union sponsored purpose.”105  Therefore, the employer’s surveillance 
and intimidation of the employees’ handbilling, and its termination of one 
of the employees who was active in the advocacy effort, violated the 
NLRA. 
 
826-27 (1979).  See also Local 174 International Union v. NLRB, 645 F.2d. 1151, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(“Preceding the candidate identification, the handout lists an assortment of issues of general concern to 
workers, but discussion of the listed issues is sparse. The dominant message conveyed by the leaflet is to 
vote for the endorsed individuals . . . .”); Educ. Minn. Lakeville v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No 194, 341 
F.Supp.2d 1070, 1080 (D. Minn. 2004) (refusing to acknowledge NLRA’s jurisdiction because the 
“principal thrust” of the 4-page John Kerry leaflet was to encourage employees to vote for specific 
candidates rather than to educate them about issues that relate to employees’ interests as employees). 
 103. Kenworth Truck Co., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 497 (1999). 
 104. Id. at 497-98. 
 105. Id. at 501. 
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The NLRB’s Union Carbide case, which involved employee advocacy 
to pressure the government to expand its enforcement of existing collective 
bargaining rights, similarly shows that the workplace rights advocacy frame 
falls within the scope of protected labor advocacy.106  In Union Carbide, an 
employee brought a petition to the employee lunchroom, which was located 
on the employer’s property.  The petition, entitled “Taxpayers’ Petition,” 
stated: 
We, the undersigned, object to Union Carbide corporation’s use of our tax 
dollars for anti-union activities. The United States Government is officially 
in favor of collective bargaining. We therefore call upon congress and the 
president to investigate and stop this improper use of our taxes.107 
After the union collected signatures for three or four days, the 
employer confiscated the petition and would not return it to the employees 
or union. 108  The NLRB concluded that the employer’s act was an NLRA 
violation.109  In other words, national-level labor advocacy on behalf of 
enforcing collective bargaining rights, which was conducted in non-
working areas during non-working time, was protected labor advocacy.110 
Applying these precedents to labor’s recent immigration advocacy 
statements illustrates that many of these statements fall within the 
workplace rights frame.  Namely, labor has often framed its comprehensive 
immigration reform advocacy and specific proposals as grounded in the 
pursuit of enhanced workplace rights, and thereby in pursuit of employees’ 
interests as employees.  The AFL-CIO/Change to Win joint platform on 
immigration, for example, claims that a comprehensive immigration reform 
agenda is important because “all workers” need “full and complete access 
to the protection of labor, health and safety, and other laws.”111  Referring to 
the joint platform, former AFL-CIO President John Sweeney stated that the 
 
 106. 259 N.L.R.B. 974, 977 (1982).  Union Carbide was enforced in relevant part and set aside in 
part by the Sixth Circuit, Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 107. Union Carbide, 259 N.L.R.B. at 977. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Similarly, the NLRB protects advocacy aimed at repealing right-to-work laws.  See, e.g., 
Griffin Pipe Products Co. and USW, 1999 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 129, at *21-22 (1999) (“It is now well 
settled that such union activity related to the repea[l] of right-to-work laws, though arguably political in 
character, falls within ‘mutual aid and protection’ clause in Section 7 that it is generally protected”); 
Hesse Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 985, 987 (1979) (finding that employer, who told employees to remove their 
bumper stickers in protest of right-to-work legislation and then suspended them for refusing to do so, 
was an NLRA violation).  See also Satterfield v. Western Elec., 758 F.2d 1252, 1253 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(concluding that employee who was fired for “distributing right-to-work literature to union members” 
suffered an NLRA violation). 
 111. AFL-CIO, The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, at 1. 
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“unified labor position” is one that is “centered on workers’ rights” for 
documented and undocumented workers alike.112 
According to labor, “legalization” of currently undocumented workers 
is a workplace rights issue and therefore an important immigration reform 
proposal.  The AFL-CIO claims that employers have used immigration 
status to “divide workers . . . in the last decade.”113  A legalization program 
would, by definition, provide these workers with a wide range of rights that 
documented individuals enjoy.114  Labor’s view is that a new legalization 
program could improve the workplace rights of undocumented employees 
because, among other things, they would no longer “lack full labor rights in 
the American workforce.”115  In this way, legalization would counter the 
growing population of what labor often refers to as an easily exploitable 
“secondary class” of workers.116 
Specifically, as newly “legalized” workers, undocumented workers 
would no longer be subject to the Supreme Court’s oft-criticized Hoffman 
 
 112. Change to Win, Change to Win and AFL-CIO Unveil Unified Immigration Reform Framework 
(2009) [hereinafter Unified Immigration Reform Framework], available at http://www.changetowin.org 
/news/change-win-and-afl-cio-unveil-unified-immigration-reform-framework.  Similarly, Arturo 
Rodriguez, president of the United Farm Workers, stated that labor’s advocacy for comprehensive 
immigration reform is in pursuit of rights and to address exploitation of all workers.  He referred to the 
“dire need” for immigration reform due to the exploitation of immigrant and domestic workers alike.  Id.  
Unions have not always been so eager to support the rights of immigrant workers.  See Stephen 
Franklin, Labor, Immigrants Find Common Ground; May Day Rally Helps Link Workers from Both 
Groups, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2008, at C3 (referring to “organized labor’s growing willingness to link with 
immigrant workers.”).  See also id. (“[U]nions have come a long way in recognizing that ‘immigrant 
workers are workers.’”). 
 113. AFL-CIO, Q & As on AFL-CIO’s Immigration Policy 1 [hereinafter AFL-CIO Q & As], 
available at http://www.cpwr.com/pdfs/Q&As%20on%20AFLCIO's%20Immigration%20Policy.pdf. 
 114. The AFL-CIO, for instance, has framed its proposal for a path to legalization as “an important 
worker protection,” which benefits all workers.  AFL-CIO, Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws 
Must Protect Working Conditions for All Workers in the U.S. (2006) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Responsible 
Reform of Immigration Laws], available at http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/EC-
Statements/Responsible-Reform-of-Immigration-Laws-Must-Protect-Working-Conditions-for-all-
Workers-in-the-U.S. 
 115. Simon, supra note 3, at 1300. 
 116. AFL-CIO Q & As, supra note 113.  See also The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, 
at 2 (claiming that undocumented workers need to be legalized because they are exploitable and do not 
have “basic protections”);  AFL-CIO Q & As, supra note 113, at 3 (stating that immigration reform 
“must provide a real path to legalization” so that undocumented workers can “exercise their labor 
rights.”); AFL-CIO Q & As, supra note 113, at 4 (“[D]ividing workers into different ‘classes’ only 
benefits employers.”  If we do not legalize, “we will only be supporting the creation of a class of 
workers who have absolutely no incentive to engage in the long-term fight for good jobs with decent 
benefits, including health care and pensions.”); Michelle Amber, Trumka Says Fixing Immigration 
Should be “Crucial Element” of Broad Economic Strategy, DAILY LAB. REP., June 21, 2010 (stating 
that “a pathway must be built that allows immigrants to be securely part of our country from day one—
able to assert their legal rights, including the right to organize, without fear of retaliation”).  The only 
way, according to the AFL-CIO, to “remove the economic incentive to exploit workers—and thus 
diminish illegal immigration—is to ensure that all workers have full labor rights.”  AFL-CIO Q & As, 
supra note 113, at 2.  In other words, immigration reform should “treat all workers as workers.”  Id. at 1 
2. GRIFFITH LEE COMPLETE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2012  6:17:08 PM 
2012 IMMIGRATION ADVOCACY AS LABOR ADVOCACY 97 
 
Plastic Compounds decision, described in Part I.  The Hoffman Court 
concluded that an undocumented worker who violated IRCA did not have 
access to NLRA backpay to remedy the employer’s NLRA violation.117  
Similar to the four dissenters, the AFL-CIO views the Supreme Court’s 
Hoffman decision as providing “a powerful new incentive” for employers to 
hire undocumented workers.118  According to the AFL-CIO, now that 
employers do not have to pay NLRA backpay to remedy their NLRA 
violations against undocumented workers, “the cost of exploiting 
immigrants [is] insignificant.”119 
Indeed, labor’s call for legalizing undocumented workers has been 
grounded in its critique of Hoffman’s aftershocks on the workplace rights of 
employees.  A United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) union 
representative asserted that “[u]nscrupulous employers are willfully 
interpreting the court’s decision to intimidate and coerce immigrants from 
standing up for their rights.”120  As a poignant example, the AFL-CIO 
recounts the story of an undocumented construction worker in New York 
who was physically incapacitated during work due to his employer’s 
negligence.  Unlike documented workers, this construction worker could 
not receive his lost earnings based on New York wage standards.  Instead, 
the employer was required to pay lost wages based on what the 
undocumented worker would have earned if he had performed the work in 
his home country.  According to the AFL-CIO, “[e]ssentially, employers 
and contractors now are able to import the workplace standards of 
developing countries into the United States.”121 
 
 117. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 118. AFL-CIO Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws, supra note 114.  See also Diane E. 
Lewis, Decision Stirs Labor Movement: Some Fear High Court’s Ruling for Firm Will Hurt 
Undocumented Workers, BOS. GLOBE, April 14, 2002, at G1 (stating that Hoffman decision had the 
“labor movement up in arms”); id. (“[T]he UFCW this month called on Congress to immediately reverse 
the decision with legislation that would protect the rights of undocumented and documented workers and 
offer uniform penalties against employers who wrongfully fire employees.”). 
 119. AFL-CIO Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws, supra note 114.  See also AFL-CIO Q & 
As, supra note 113, at 2 (describing Hoffman as creating “yet another economic incentive to recruit and 
employ undocumented workers”); Testimony of Jonathon P. Hiatt before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, 
Border Security, and International law (May 24, 2007) 3, available at 
http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/Hiatt_Test.pdf?docID=5321 (referring to the Hoffman decision 
and stating that the “holding has, in practice, made it much more difficult, and in some cases impossible, 
for an entire class of workers to exercise the right to join a union and bargain collectively”); Simon, 
supra note 3, at 1299 (“Another proffered connection between immigration law and labor standards is 
that workers’ undocumented status forecloses the availability of certain remedies under the NLRA.”). 
 120. Food and Commercial Workers Condemn Court Decision on Immigrant Workers, PR 
NEWSWIRE, April 2, 2002, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/food-and-
commercial-workers-condemn-court-decision-on-immigrant-workers-76740602.html. 
 121. AFL-CIO Q & As, supra note 113, at 2. 
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Labor has also framed its immigration reform demands for 
improvements to labor and employment law enforcement as a workplace 
rights issue.122  Many unions view employer exploitation of undocumented 
workers’ rights as connected to the inadequate enforcement of the labor and 
employment protections that are already on the books.123  As a response, the 
AFL-CIO/Change to Win joint platform calls for improved labor and 
employment law enforcement on behalf of all workers.124  Moreover, in an 
effort to spur comprehensive immigration reform, the labor federations’ 
platform urged the Obama administration and Congress to work to address 
concerns over the “fuel[ing] of discrimination and exploitation of 
workers.”125  To combat these workers’ rights issues, the labor federations 
advocated for immigration reform “centered on workers’ rights.”126 
Additionally, labor has connected its specific proposal for improving 
the guest worker program to enhancing workplace rights.127  To critique the 
 
 122. See, e.g.,  AFL-CIO Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws, supra note 114 
(“[I]mmigration reform law must provide real and enforceable remedies for labor and employment law 
violations that are available to all workers, regardless of their immigration status.”). 
 123. AFL-CIO, Recognizing Our Common Bonds, available at 
http://www.rnsworkingtogether.net/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/publications/magazine/commonbonds.cfm 
(“[T]he AFL-CIO has played a key role in strengthening workplace rights in the enforcement of 
immigration laws, including persuading the Labor Department to stop inspecting workers' immigration 
papers while examining complaints of labor standards abuses.”). 
 124. The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, at 1. 
 125. Unified Immigration Reform Framework, supra note 112. 
 126. Id. See also Change to Win, Statement by Change to Win Chair Anna Burger on Immigration 
Reform Bill Approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee (2006) [hereinafter Statement by Anna 
Burger], available at http://www.changetowin.org/news/statement-change-win-chair-anna-burger-
immigration-reform-bill-approved-senate-judiciary (stating that we need improved worker protections 
“to ensure that all employees are treated fairly and have the same legal protections, regardless of their 
immigration status”).  While reminding rally supporters that unions were founded by immigrants, 
Change to Win Chair Anna Burger framed immigration advocacy in terms of working conditions such 
as a “job with a paycheck that supports a family, affordable health care, and a retirement with dignity.” 
Change to Win, Remarks for Immigration Rally on Capitol Steps by Change to Win Chair Anna Burger 
(2006) [hereinafter Remarks on Capitol Steps], available at http://www.changetowin.org/news/remarks-
immigration-rally-capitol-steps-change-win-chair-anna-burger. In the same way, the AFL-CIO has 
declared that it “will continue to support effective, credible and enforceable rights for all workers, 
regardless of their country of origin or immigration status,” including enforceable remedies for labor and 
employment law violations.   AFL-CIO Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws, supra note 114. 
 127. See, e.g.,  AFL-CIO Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws, supra note 114 (“Workers 
around the country are witnessing the transformation of formerly well-paying, permanent jobs into 
temporary jobs with little or no benefits, which employers are staffing with vulnerable foreign workers 
who have no real enforceable rights through the guestworker programs.”); AFL-CIO, In Support of 
Statement on Immigration Reform (2003) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Statement on Immigration Reform], 
available at http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/EC-Statements/In-Support-of-Statement-on-
Immigration-Reform (“Legally and practically, guestworkers have never been afforded the same 
workplace protections as domestic workers . . . The vulnerability of these workers inescapably leads to 
severe and frequent instances of employer abuse and government neglect.  The current guestworker 
programs should be reformed to provide essential labor market and workplace protections for both 
immigrant and non-immigrant workers.”). 
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inadequacies of modern guest worker programs, labor sometimes evokes 
the history of guest worker programs, described in Part I.  Referring to the 
Bracero Program, the AFL-CIO has stated that, “[w]e know from 
experience that [guest worker] programs have created an exploitable and 
exploited cheap labor force.”128 Noting that current guest worker programs 
have fewer workplace protections than the Bracero Program, the AFL-CIO 
asserts that, despite extensive protections, “Braceros experienced numerous 
abuses, including racial oppression, economic hardship and mistreatment by 
employers” and “had a well-documented downward effect on the wages of 
U.S. citizen farm workers.”129  Because of current “substandard” conditions 
for guest workers, labor claims that immigration reform must provide 
adequate workplace protections for guest workers.130  Moreover, labor 
asserts that an independent labor market commission, which would better 
control the flow of foreign workers, is essential because “it is not good 
policy for a democracy to admit large numbers of workers with limited civil 
and employment rights.”131 
According to labor, workplace rights would also be enhanced if 
immigration reform contained changes to existing restrictive immigration 
measures.  These changes, labor contends, might include more effective 
 
 128. AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO’s Model for “Future Flow”: Foreign Workers Must Have Full Rights 2, 
http://fcnl.org/assets/model_for_future_flow.pdf.  See also AFL-CIO Responsible Reform of 
Immigration Laws, supra note 114 (stating that there were “abuses” against braceros that “are well 
documented”); AFL-CIO Statement on Immigration Reform, supra note 127 (“Current foreign worker 
programs contain many of the same shortcomings as the notorious bracero program, which began in 
1943 as a wartime emergency program but continued amid great controversy until 1964.  Legally and 
practically, guestworkers have never been afforded the same workplace protections as domestic workers, 
and, as non-immigrants, they have been denied the democratic rights and economic bargaining power of 
immigrants and citizens.”). 
 129. Testimony of Jonathon P. Hiatt before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International law 
8 (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/civilrights/immigration/upload/ 
Hiatt_Test.pdf; id. at 7 (referring to the 1917 guest worker program and stating that “[t]he United States 
has been experimenting with temporary worker programs for almost a century without a single 
success”). Testimony of UFCW before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International law (May 24, 
2007), available at http://www.ufcw.org/issues/immigration/ufcw_political_involvement/mjw_ 
testimony.cfm  (“The post-World War II Bracero program was synonymous with worker abuse.  Modern 
versions of the same . . . have had similar negative effects.”). 
 130. AFL-CIO Q & As, supra note 113, at 3 (stating that immigration reform “must guarantee that 
new foreign workers will be able to fully exercise their labor rights”); Anna Burger, Immigration Letter 
from Anna Burger to Arlen Specter (2006) [hereinafter Immigration Letter to Senator Specter], available 
at http://www.changetowin.org/news/immigration-letter-anna-burger-arlen-specter (noting that 
temporary guest worker programs must “mandate fair wages and working conditions for all workers”).  
According to the AFL-CIO, guest workers “are unlikely to complain about substandard working 
conditions because if they do they could lose their jobs and face deportation.”  AFL-CIO Q & As, supra 
note 113, at 3. 
 131. Elizabeth Kenigsberg, Labor Coalition Outlines Immigration Reform Plan, CONGRESSNOW, 
April 14, 2009. 
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border control efforts and improvements to IRCA’s worker authorization 
system.  The AFL-CIO, for instance, supports the imposition of new 
restrictive immigration measures at the U.S-Mexico border to deter future 
undocumented immigration because it believes that the current immigration 
system allows employers to exploit these unregulated workers.132  With 
respect to IRCA’s worker authorization measures, labor’s joint platform 
asserts that federal immigration authorities must check immigration status 
“accurately while providing maximum protection for workers.”133  
Similarly, the UFCW has stated that IRCA’s “employment verification 
system is inaccurate, inefficient, and easily manipulated by employers eager 
to take advantage of cheap foreign labor.”134  Along similar lines, the AFL-
CIO has contended that IRCA’s audits of employers and workplace-
immigration raids have “undermined efforts to protect workers’ rights.”135 
ii. The Wages and Working Conditions Frame 
In addition to protecting employees’ advocacy framed as a general call 
for workplace rights, the NLRA’s mutual aid or protection clause protects 
advocacy that is connected to wages and working conditions that exceed 
baseline workplace rights.136  The Eastex Court, for instance, protected 
labor advocacy related to the national minimum wage even though the 
advocating workers were not minimum-wage employees.137  According to 
the Court, “minimum wage inevitably influences wage levels derived from 
collective bargaining, even those far above the minimum.”138  Similarly, the 
 
 132. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Q & As, supra note 113, at 4 (“An ‘open borders’ policy would play into 
the hands of corporations that would like nothing better than to treat workers as commodities.”). 
 133. The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, at 1. 
 134. Testimony of UFCW before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International law (May 24, 
2007), available at http://www.ufcw.org/issues/immigration/ufcw_political_involvement/mjw_ 
testimony.cfm. 
 135. See Raids, I-9 Audits Undercut Worker Rights AFL-CIO, Worker Groups Say in New Report, 
DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 28, 2009 (“The Department  of Homeland Security’s immigration  enforcement 
efforts, including workplace raids and I-9 audits, have undermined efforts to protect workers’ rights, 
according to a report released Oct. 27 by the AFL-CIO, American Rights at Work, and the National 
Employment  Law Project.”); see also id. (“The groups called on the Obama administration to 
vigorously enforce labor laws and ensure that workplace enforcement of immigration laws does not 
interfere with workers’ rights.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Remarks on Capitol Steps, supra note 126 (stating, at a rally, that “[w]e all know too 
well that our broken immigration system allows employers to exploit undocumented workers and drive 
down pay and benefits for all workers in this country”); Statement by Anna Burger, supra note 126 
(stating that immigration reform will ensure that employers “pay fair wages”). 
 137. Eastex, 437 U.S. 556, 569-70 (1978) (stating “[t]he union’s call . . . for [] employees to back 
persons who support an increase in the minimum wage, and to oppose those who oppose it, fairly is 
characterized as concerted activity for the ‘mutual aid or protection’ of petitioner’s employees and of 
employees generally”). 
 138. Id. at 569 (1978) (quoting Eastex, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 271, 274 (1974)). 
2. GRIFFITH LEE COMPLETE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2012  6:17:08 PM 
2012 IMMIGRATION ADVOCACY AS LABOR ADVOCACY 101 
 
Eastex Court reasoned that there was a sufficient connection between the 
advocacy and employees’ interests as employees because “concern by [] 
employees for the plight of other employees might gain support for them at 
some future time when they might have a dispute with their employer.”139 
Post-Eastex case law confirms that advocacy which relates sufficiently 
to other kinds of enhanced working conditions is protected labor 
advocacy.140  The NLRB, for instance, has deemed employee advocacy 
related to worker safety to be protected labor advocacy.  In Riverboat 
Services of Indiana, the NLRB protected employee advocacy aimed at 
ensuring that future engineers would have sufficient experience to safely 
operate maritime vessels.141  According to the NLRB in that case, the 
NLRA prohibited the employer from firing employees for writing a letter to 
the Coast Guard because there was a direct nexus between the advocacy and 
worker safety.142  In GHR Energy Corporation, the NLRB protected 
employee testimony before state and federal legislatures regarding 
environmental law reform.  The employer had threatened a lawsuit against 
the employees in retaliation for the testimony.143  The NLRB concluded that 
there was a sufficient connection between the advocacy and the working 
conditions of employees who handle toxic materials, including “not only [] 
the Respondent’s employees but [] employees generally.”144 
 
 139. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 569 (citing 215 N.L.R.B. at 274).  But see Holling Press, Inc., 343 
N.L.R.B. 301, 302-03 (2004) (holding that an employee’s pursuit of co-worker support for her state 
sexual harassment claim against the employer was personal, and therefore not for mutual aid or 
protection, because the complaint was “individual in nature” and her actions were “not made to 
accomplish a collective goal”). 
 140. For instance, the NLRB has protected employees who took action in protest of a judicial 
settlement that affected their retirement benefits.  See Southern California Gas Company and Utility 
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, Local 132, 321 N.L.R.B. 551, 556 (1996) (“[W]hen employees 
whose collectively negotiated wages and benefits include the right to participate in a retirement plan 
under which they necessarily will become PE shareholders, and whose payout value to the employees on 
retirement will thus necessarily depend on the value of PE stock, those employees have not merely a 
‘shareholder’s interest’ in the outcome of a lawsuit affecting the value of PE’s corporate treasury (and in 
turn, the value of its stock), but a very real stake as employees of the Respondent in the value of their 
retirement benefit plan.”). 
 141. Riverboat Services of Indiana, 345 N.L.R.B. 1286 (2005). 
 142. Id. at 1294. 
 143. GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1014 (1989). 
 144. Id. The Motorola, Inc. case is another example.  Motorola refused to allow distribution of 
literature in support of a city ordinance that would prohibit employee drug testing “in nonworking areas 
[of the employer’s] property during nonworking time” and argued that these communications were 
unprotected “purely political tracts.”  Motorola, Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 580, 585 (1991).  The literature 
contained a membership application that incorporated the organization’s position statement on the back, 
asserting, among other things, that it opposed drug testing.  It also included a document entitled “Stop 
Random Drug Testing,” which, among other things, asked the Austin City Council to “vote against 
random drug testing.”  Id. at 583.  Although neither of the disputed documents referenced Motorola 
specifically, or any labor dispute occurring there, the NLRB rejected the employer’s argument.  Id. at 
585.  The NLRB held that the documents constituted appeals to legislators to protect employees’ 
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Many of labor’s immigration advocacy messages fall within the wages 
and working conditions frame, as interpreted by the NLRB and courts.  It is 
very common for labor to view immigration reform as an issue that affects 
not only employees’ legal rights to a minimum level of wages and working 
conditions, but also employees’ access to wages and working conditions 
that are, or have been historically, superior to the legal minimums.  The 
AFL-CIO/Change to Win platform, for instance, connects the need for 
comprehensive immigration reform to the goals of “limiting wage 
competition” and “strengthening labor standards.”145 
Moreover, labor unions link their specific calls for a legalization 
program as part of comprehensive immigration reform to the fate of 
heightened wages and working conditions of employees.  For example, in 
the AFL-CIO/Change to Win platform, labor explains its rationale for a 
legalization program in the following way:  
if these immigrants are not given adequate incentive to ‘come out of the 
shadows’ to adjust their status, we will continue to have a large pool of 
unauthorized workers whom employers will continue to exploit to drive 
down wages and other standards to the detriment of all workers.146 
Unions have similarly connected wages and working conditions to 
immigration proposals for the enhancement of labor and employment law 
enforcement and for improvements to the guest worker program.  The AFL-
CIO/Change to Win platform states, for example, that improved labor and 
employment law enforcement would “ensure that immigration does not 
depress wages and working conditions or encourage marginal low-wage 
industries that depend heavily on substandard wages.”147  According to the 
 
interests as employees.  According to the NLRB, they were “directly related to the working conditions 
of [Motorola’s] employees, who faced the implementation of mandatory drug testing.”  Id. at 580.  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals, however, failed to enforce the Board’s order, finding that employees that are 
acting as members of outside political organizations do not have the same NLRA rights as employees 
engaged in “self-organization, collective bargaining, or in self-representation in disputes with 
management . . . .”  NLRB v. Motorola, Inc., 991 F.2d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 145. The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, at 1.  Similarly, Richard Trumka, president 
of the AFL-CIO, has proclaimed that “immigration reform must be based on the principle that U.S. 
workers deserve to share in the wealth they create and that wages should increase with productivity.”  
Michelle Amber, Trumka Says Fixing Immigration Should be “Crucial Element” of Broad Economic 
Strategy, DAILY LAB. REP., June 21, 2010. 
 146. The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, at 2.  Similarly, the AFL-CIO has asserted 
that without the proposed legalization program, “the economic incentive to hire and exploit the 
undocumented will remain, to the detriment of U.S. workers who labor in the same industries as the 
undocumented, because all workers will see their working conditions plummet.”  AFL-CIO Responsible 
Reform of Immigration Laws, supra note 114. 
 147. The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, at 1.  See id. (asserting that limiting wage 
competition requires a reduction in the exploitation of undocumented workers and that exploited 
unauthorized workers allow employers to drive down wages of all workers). 
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AFL-CIO, enforcing workplace law is “[t]he only way to remedy” declines 
in wages and working conditions.148 
Similarly, Change to Win has advocated for changes to the guest 
worker program that would “mandate fair wages . . . for all workers, U.S. 
native and immigrant” and would not “undermine the wages and working 
conditions of Americans.”149  With respect to greater controls on the inflow 
of foreign workers each year, Change to Win has stated that if we “protect 
our borders and control the flow of immigration,” undocumented workers 
are less likely to be “used as fodder in the corporate push to drive down 
wages and working conditions.”150  The wages and working conditions 
frame thus provides employees and labor unions with significant latitude to 
frame their immigration advocacy messages. 
iii. The Job Opportunities and Security Frame 
Immigration law as a job creation151 and job security issue152 is another 
broad advocacy frame that falls within the scope of the NLRA’s mutual aid 
or protection clause.  Similar to the workplace rights frame and the wages 
and working conditions frame, the job opportunities and security frame is 
protected labor advocacy because it sufficiently relates to employees’ 
interest as employees.153 
 
 148. AFL-CIO Q & As, supra note 113, at 4. 
 149. Immigration Letter to Senator Specter, supra note 130. 
 150. Community Alliance, Change to Win’s Agenda for Restoring the American Dream 8 (2006), 
available at http://www.fresnoalliance.com/home/magazine/2006/2006_CA_DEC_8-14.pdf.  With 
respect to labor market tests associated with the guest worker program, labor has advocated changes so 
that they more accurately portray labor shortages and thereby improve employees’ wages and working 
conditions.   The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, at 2 (commenting that the labor market 
commission will create a new methodology that will “examine the impact of immigration on the 
economy, wages, the workforce and business”); Immigration Letter to Senator Specter, supra note 130 
(noting that temporary guest worker programs must “ensure that the program does not undermine the 
wages and working conditions of Americans”). 
 151. Michelle Amber, Trumka Says Fixing Immigration Should be “Crucial Element” of Broad 
Economic Strategy, DAILY LAB. REP., June 21, 2010. 
 152. Parks, James, Trumka: Immigration Reform Crucial for New Economy (2010), available at 
http://blog.aflcio.org/2010/06/18/trumka-immigration-reform-crucial-for-new-economy/ (citing Rich 
Trumka as stating, “[o]ur immigration system makes a mockery of the American dream. The people 
doing the hardest work for the least money have no legal protections, no ability to send their children to 
college, no real right to form a union, no economic or legal security.”). See also Days Without 
Immigrants, supra note 3, at 94 (“[C]ongressional legislation likely to lead to the loss of immigrant 
workers’ jobs—through increasingly aggressive enforcement of immigration laws—can be readily 
conceived as both ‘work’ disputes and mass political protests over immigration policy.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Tradesmen Int’l, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 1158 (2000) (enforcement denied 275 F.3d 1137 
(D.C. Cir. 2002)) (finding a nexus between concerted attempt to secure the employer’s compliance with 
a city bonding ordinance and protecting employees’ job opportunities); Motorola, 305 N.L.R.B. 580 
(1991) (finding a nexus between mandatory drug testing and potential loss of jobs for refusing drug 
testing). 
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The NLRB’s decision in Kaiser Engineers, which was upheld by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, demonstrates this trend 
specifically in the context of employees’ immigration advocacy during the 
1970s.154  In Kaiser, employees wrote letters to persuade legislators to 
“prevent the increased influx of alien engineers [for the] mutual aid or 
protection” of engineers and other union members.155  One of the employees 
found out that his employer’s competitor applied to the U.S. Department of 
Labor to increase visas for foreign engineers.156  After employees sent 
letters to their legislators during non-work time to oppose this immigration 
policy change, their employer interrogated them and constructively 
discharged them because of the letters.157 
The NLRB and the Ninth Circuit in Kaiser reasoned that the 
employees’ immigration advocacy was sufficiently connected to 
employees’ interests as employees.158  They, thus, concluded that this 
advocacy was protected labor advocacy.  Because the advocacy’s purpose 
was to oppose the influx of foreign engineers who could threaten U.S. 
engineers’ job security, it was for the “mutual aid or protection” of the 
Kaiser engineers specifically, as well as “fellow engineers in the 
profession” generally.159  The employees believed that the immigration 
policy changes would affect their job security and the job security of other 
engineers.160  The court concluded “that the concerted activity of 
employees, lobbying legislators regarding changes in national policy which 
affect their job security, can be action taken for ‘mutual aid or protection’ 
within the meaning of [the NLRA].”161 
 
 154. Kaiser Engineers, 213 N.L.R.B. 752, 755 (1974), enforced, 538 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 155. Id. at 755. 
 156. Id. at 754. 
 157. Id. 
 158. The Supreme Court in Eastex, Inc. “cited the NLRB’s decision in Kaiser twice with apparent 
approval” of Kaiser’s rule that employee legislative appeals regarding immigration policy that affects 
job security is within the scope of the protection of Section 7’s “mutual aid or protection” clause. Days 
Without Immigrants, supra note 3, at 102. See Eastex, 437 U.S. 556, 565-66 (1978) (citing Kaiser for the 
proposition that “[I]t has been held that the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause protects employees from 
retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve working conditions through resort to 
administrative and judicial forums, and that employees’ appeals to legislators to protect their interests as 
employees are within the scope of this clause.”).  For other cases that cite Kaiser with approval see 
NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 700 F.2d 385, 387 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Kaiser to state “that 
lobbying in opposition to proposed changes in the immigration laws was protected activity”) and NLRB 
v. Southern California Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Kaiser for the 
proposition that “Section 7 protects employees’ concerted lobbying for changes in national policy 
regarding job security”). 
 159. Kaiser, 213 N.L.R.B. at 755. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Kaiser Engineers v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1385 (1974). 
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While labor unions today are notably more pro-immigrant than the 
labor movement of the 1970s, labor’s immigration advocacy message 
nonetheless continues to relate to employees’ job opportunities and job 
security.  Recently, the AFL-CIO has said that “[its] top priority is jobs, 
jobs, jobs” and that “you can’t get there unless you address” immigration 
reform.162  Moreover, labor has communicated that an underlying 
motivation for its support of comprehensive immigration reform is 
“protecting the employment status of immigrant workers” who are already 
here163 and “reduc[ing] employers’ incentive to hire undocumented workers 
rather than U.S. workers.”164 
Proposals that call for the legalization of undocumented employees 
relate, by definition, to job security.  If the status of undocumented 
employees is adjusted, formerly undocumented employees cannot lose their 
jobs due to immigration enforcement efforts.  Moreover, labor has 
connected the proposals for an independent labor commission to the job 
prospects of employees.  Specifically, labor has proposed a better 
connection between immigrant worker inflow into the guest worker 
program and U.S. labor market supply and demand.165  For example, the 
AFL-CIO has advocated for the quantity of available employment-based 
visas to be based more accurately on “macroeconomic indicators and the 
needs of particular industries.”166 
Likewise, labor has opposed the expansion of temporary guest worker 
programs, with their insufficient workplace protections for guest workers, 
because of job security concerns.  Labor claims that “formerly well-paying, 
permanent jobs” are being turned “into temporary jobs with little or no 
 
 162. Michelle Amber, Trumka Says Fixing Immigration Should be “Crucial Element” of Broad 
Economic Strategy, DAILY LAB. REP., June 21, 2010. 
 163. Change to Win, Change to Win Helps Uphold Immigrant Workers’ Rights (2006), available at 
http://www.changetowin.org/news/change-win-helps-uphold-immigrant-workers-rights (detailing 
settlement agreements reached with the agreement of the NLRB with respect to unfair labor practice 
allegations filed by the union on behalf of workers who were fired for participating in immigration 
rallies).  See also Days Without Immigrants, supra note 3, at 94, 106 (describing labor as “protest[ing] 
congressional legislation likely to lead to the loss of immigrant workers’ jobs—through increasingly 
aggressive enforcement of immigration laws” and “those changes would operate to suspend the 
employment relationship altogether”). 
 164. The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, at 1. 
 165. Id. at 2 (calling the “arbitrarily” set level of employment-based immigration “one of the 
greatest failures of our current employment-based immigration system,” and advocating that the number 
of available employment visas be determined by an independent commission, using a Congressionally-
approved methodology to determine numbers based on labor market needs).  AFL-CIO Responsible 
Reform of Immigration Laws, supra note 114 (opposing any legislative expansion of temporary 
guestworker programs and calling for a link between available visas and established labor market 
needs). 
 166. AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO’s Model for “Future Flow”: Foreign Workers Must Have Full Rights 2, 
http://fcnl.org/assets/model_for_future_flow.pdf. 
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benefits, which employers are staffing with vulnerable foreign workers who 
have no real enforceable rights.”167  Labor has also connected job security 
and opportunities to restrictive immigration measures.  Change to Win, for 
instance, has urged Congress not to target undocumented workers who are 
already in the United States and working in low-wage jobs.  Instead, 
immigration reform should improve border control “to prevent illegal 
immigration” in the future and should not target “dishwashers, janitors, 
farmworkers, and nursing home or construction workers” who are laboring 
in our economy.168 
The NLRA has the potential to protect a broad range of immigration 
advocacy, including concerted activity on behalf of comprehensive 
immigration reform.  If the advocacy is primarily framed as a workplace 
rights, wages and working conditions, job opportunities or job security 
issue, the NLRA would protect immigration advocacy the same way it 
would protect other forms of protected labor advocacy.  Thus, it would 
generally protect immigration advocacy reflected on solidarity buttons or 
ribbons worn in working areas169 of the employer’s property, as well as 
solicitation and distribution of literature taking place in non-working 
areas170 of the employer’s property, such as the break room171 or parking lot.  
 
 167. AFL-CIO Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws, supra note 114; Amber McKinney, AFL-
CIO Pitted Against Chamber in Debate Over Future Flow of Immigrants, Commission, DAILY LAB. 
REP., March 16, 2010 (criticizing guestworker program and stating that “American workers are facing a 
prolonged job crisis and nearly 10 percent unemployment”); New H-2B Wage Rules an Improvement, 
but Delay Hurts Workers (January 18, 2011), http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Political-Action-
Legislation/New-H-2B-Wage-Rules-an-Improvement-But-Delay-Hurts-Workers (“[I]n the future, U.S. 
workers will be first in line for jobs that currently go to temporary foreign workers.  But the 
administration’s decision to delay implementation means the change won’t come soon enough for 
unemployed workers who need jobs now.”); AFL-CIO Q & As, supra note 113, at 3 (“Guest worker 
programs allow corporations to turn permanent jobs into temporary jobs staffed by foreign workers who 
often are unable to exercise their labor rights.”).  Labor has similarly fought against the conversion of 
“tens of thousands of permanent, well-paying jobs in the United States into temporary jobs through the 
use of various guestworker programs.”  AFL-CIO Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws, supra note 
114.  See also AFL-CIO, Reform the H-1B and L-1 Guest Worker Visa Programs (2003), available at 
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec08062003e.cfm (linking the unemployment of 
“a growing number of well-educated and highly skilled U.S. professional and technical workers” to 
“dysfunctional U.S. guest worker policies”). 
 168. Statement by Anna Burger, supra note 126 
 169. Employees generally have the right to wear union insignia while at work.  Republic Aviation 
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801-803 (1945).  The Board may limit or ban the wearing of insignia if 
there are special circumstances that outweigh the impact on employees’ Section 7 rights.  See Albis 
Plastics, 335 N.L.R.B. 923, 924 (2001); Mack’s Supermarkets, 288 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1098 (1988). 
 170. Employee’s Section 7 rights in non-work areas on non-work time vary based on whether the 
communication is determined to be a solicitation or a distribution.  The Board has held that that 
employees may engage in distribution on nonworking time in nonwork areas, Stoddard-Stoddard-Quirk 
Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962), while employer rules that limit employee solicitation in the 
workplace require a balancing test between the employees’ Section 7 rights and the employer’s interest 
in maintaining discipline.  Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 793. 
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It would also generally protect concerted immigration advocacy during non-
working time,172 including employees’ participation at immigration reform 
activities and employee communications via Facebook,173 email,174 or some 
other means of communication.175 
While we focused Part II’s doctrinal analysis primarily on labor 
unions’ statements, the NLRA has the potential to protect collective 
immigration advocacy efforts in non-unionized settings as well.  The NLRA 
merely requires the existence of collective activity among employees for 
their “mutual aid or protection”—it does not require the involvement of a 
 
 171. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1062 n.4 (November 3, 2006) (holding that an 
employer interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights if it removes union literature from a bulletin board 
in the employee break room while continuing to allow employees to post nonwork-related material on 
the same bulletin board). 
 172. Absent the disruption of production or interference with the employers’ ability to maintain 
discipline, an employer cannot discipline workers for engaging in work-related advocacy during 
nonwork time in nonwork areas.  See Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 572-76 (1978); Union Carbide, 
259 N.L.R.B. at 977; Republic Aviation 324 U.S. at 798.  See also GC Memo 08-10 at 8-9. 
 173. In three recent decisions issued by Administrative Law Judges, employee complaints via 
Facebook were protected because they involved employee conversations over their terms and conditions 
of employment.  In Three D, LLC, 2012 N.L.R.B. Lexis 13 (2012), employees wrote about problems at 
their workplace on Facebook.  In Knauz BMW, 2011 N.L.R.B. Lexis 554 (2011), an employee posted 
photos and comments criticizing the food the employer served to customers of the dealership.  In 
Hispanics United of Buffalo, one worker’s criticism of other employees and their response on Facebook 
was protected concerted activity because it involved employee conversation over their terms and 
conditions of employment.  See 2011 N.L.R.B. Lexis 503 (2011).  For more information on cases before 
the NLRB involving employee use of all types of social media, see Memorandum from Anne Purcell, 
Associate General Counsel, NLRB, to All Reg’l Dir., Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers, Report 
of the Acting General Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases (August 18, 2011). 
 174. In Guard Publishing Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1110-1114 (December 2007), the Board held 
that employees have no statutory right to use an employer’s email system for Section 7 purposes, unless 
the restrictions are enforced discriminatorily.  In support of its decision, the Board cites a long line of 
cases that employees lack a statutory right to use an employer’s equipment or media, absent 
discriminatory restrictions.  See e.g. Mid-Mountain Foods, 332 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (2000) (no statutory 
right to use the television in the respondent’s break room to show a pro-union campaign video).  In 
addition, a rule prohibiting personal emails that would cause “embarrassment to the company” does not 
violate 8(a)(1).  Lafayette Park, 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998), enforced 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that rules precluding harm to an employer’s reputation are lawful if they would not be 
construed by employees as prohibiting Section 7 activity). 
 175. In general, employee website postings relating to terms or conditions of employment or a 
labor dispute have been protected.  See Valley Hospital, 351 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1252 (2007), enforced sub 
nom Nevada Service Employees Union, Local 1107 v. NLRB, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 25204 (9th Cir. 
2009) (protecting employee website statements concerning patient staffing levels because they were 
related to terms and conditions of employment, and not “so disloyal, reckless or maliciously untrue” to 
lose protection); Endicott Interconnect Technologies, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 448, 450 (2005), enforcement 
denied, 453 F.3d 532 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (protecting employee website statements that the employer was 
“being tanked by a group of people that have no good ability to manage it” because of the “requisite 
nexus” between the statements and an ongoing labor dispute).  However, the Board has not protected 
website conduct that is not linked to working conditions.  See Amcast Automotive, 348 N.L.R.B. 836, 
838-40 (2006) (finding that without evidence of a “direct impact” on terms and conditions of 
employment, Section 7 does not extend to website conduct regarding the ownership of the employer). 
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labor union.176  As long as the employees frame their immigration advocacy 
messages in ways that fall within the NLRA’s protective scope, the NLRA 
could encompass and protect the immigration advocacy of nascent non-
union worker groups, as well as other collective advocacy efforts of non-
unionized employees.177 
C. Unprotected Frames 
Although the NLRA’s protection of immigration advocacy may be 
broader than expected, it is not limitless.  Under existing case law, if 
employees were to primarily frame immigration advocacy in either of two 
main ways, it would be primarily for a political purpose and therefore less 
likely to be protected by the NLRA.  First, the NLRA would not protect 
advocacy that is primarily on behalf of others—advocacy in the public 
interest—with no direct link to employees’ workplace concerns.  Often, this 
situation arises when a group of employees is responsible for the care of a 
class of non-employee students, patients, or customers.  For example, in 
Five Star Transportation Inc.,178 the NLRB found that school bus drivers 
who wrote letters to the school district complaining about their own 
working conditions were engaged in NLRA-protected labor advocacy.  
However, the NLRB determined that other drivers, whose letters were 
found to raise general safety concerns primarily on behalf of students, rather 
than employees, were not engaged in protected activity.179 
While labor’s framings of immigration reform have been largely 
dominated by concern for employees’ workplace rights, wages and working 
conditions, and job opportunities and job security, labor’s framings have 
sometimes included a concern for the public interest.  For instance, labor 
has called for immigration reform that would turn immigrant workers into 
 
 176. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 (2006). 
 177. See e.g.,  NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 851-852 (1984) (“[I]t is evident that 
in enacting § 7 of the NLRA, Congress sought generally to equalize the bargaining power of the 
employee with that of his employer by allowing employees to band together [to engage in protected 
activity]. There is no indication that Congress intended to limit this protection to situations in which an 
employee’s activity and that of his fellow employees combine with one another in any particular way.  
Nor, more specifically, does it appear that Congress intended to have this general protection withdrawn 
in situations in which a single employee, acting alone, participates in an integral aspect of a collective 
process.”). 
 178. 349 N.L.R.B. 42 (2007). 
 179. Five Star Transportation, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 42, 44-45 (2007).  Similarly, the NLRB found 
that nurses in Misericordia Hospital Medical Center who complained to state government agencies 
about insufficient staffing were engaged in protected labor advocacy.  Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr, 246 
N.L.R.B. 351, 357 (1979), enforced, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980).  However, the NLRB did not protect 
nurses at Orchard Park Health Care Center, Inc. who complained about the effects of excessive heat on 
patients, rather than employees.  Orchard Park Health Care Center, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 642, 643 (2004).  
But see Manor Care of Easton, PA, LLC, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 39 n. 13, at *14 (finding that solicitation of 
support for union opposition to merger that would allegedly impact patient care was NLRA-protected). 
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taxpayers.180  The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) has stated 
that “[e]very day that Washington fails to act [on passing comprehensive 
immigration reform], we forgo the enormous economic benefits that 
immigration reform would bring . . . We lose the taxes that immigrants 
would pay.”181  Depending on the context, other broad public interest 
arguments that labor may make in support of immigration reform may not 
be protected if these arguments are not accompanied by protected frames.  
This may include arguments that are primarily based on family 
reunification182 or a more rational use of the nation’s resources.183  These 
kinds of arguments lack a connection to employees’ interests as employees. 
Second, the NLRA would not protect advocacy that is primarily for or 
against political candidates and parties, without a sufficient link to 
employees’ interests as employees.  The NLRB has held, for example, that 
“purely political tract[s]”—advocacy in support of political issues or 
candidates that does not have any relation to particular employment-related 
issues—are “so attenuated” from employees’ interests as employees that 
they cannot be thought of as conduct for mutual aid or protection.184  The 
NLRB’s Ford Motor Company185 case is a prime example of this type of 
unprotected labor advocacy.  In Ford, the union distributed a newsletter that 
included political issues such as the national economy, the role of union 
leaders in politics, and the need for a national labor party.186  The NLRB 
 
 180. Republican Framing of Immigration Policy As Pro-Worker Lacks Merit, Report Says, DAILY 
LAB. REP., Jan. 24, 2011. 
 181. Amber McKinney, White House Hosts Two Immigration Meetings To Assess Outlook for 
Possible Overhaul Bill, DAILY LAB. REP., March 22, 2010. 
 182. The Labor Movement’s Framework, supra note 7, at 1 (“Family reunification is an important 
goal of immigration policy and it is in the national interest for it to remain that way.”).  In some 
contexts, this frame may be protected as well.  See, e.g., id. (stating that “the failure to allow family 
reunification creates strong pressures for unauthorized immigration” and that “families are the most 
basic learning institutions, teaching children values as well as skills to succeed in school, society and at 
work.”).  See also id. (“Finally, families are important economic units that provide valuable sources of 
entrepreneurship, job training, support for members who are unemployed and information and 
networking for better labor market information.”). 
 183. BNA, Labor Relations Week, New SEIU Secretary-Treasurer Medina Says Immigration 
Overhaul a Major Goal, DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 4, 2010 (reporting that SEIU contends that 
comprehensive immigration reform would allow the nation to employ “its resources more rationally”). 
 184. Firestone Steel Products Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 826, 826-27, enforced 645 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (1979) (finding the leaflets were “purely political [tracts],” and thus not protected under the 
“mutual aid or protection” clause because they supported political candidates and did not “relate to 
employee problems and concerns as employees”); Caterpillar, Inc. and International Union, United 
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 1997 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 192, at 
*30 (1997) (finding a Clinton/Gore sticker on a toolbox to be “purely political”); Kelly v. USPS, 492 
F.Supp. 121, 126 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (finding, in a case involving buttons and T-shirts commenting on 
U.S. policy in Iran, that the commentary was “purely political”). 
 185. Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 663 (1975), enforced, 546 F.2d 418 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
 186. Id. at 666. 
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determined that the newsletter’s focus on asking employees to seek an 
independent workers’ party deemed it unprotected as “purely a political 
tract.”187  As part of its comprehensive immigration reform efforts, labor 
generally has not tied its advocacy to particular political candidates or 
political parties.188  If this type of advocacy were to dominate labor’s 
immigration advocacy frames in the future, however, it would be unlikely 
to receive NLRA protection from employer interference. 
Although the NLRA’s protective scope certainly has limits, it 
nonetheless has the potential to protect many forms of employees’ 
immigration advocacy in both union and non-union settings.  The NLRB 
has a significant amount of latitude when interpreting the NLRA.189  As the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated in a case involving the NLRA and employee 
advocacy, the NLRB “is entitled to” consider “the widely recognized 
impact” that certain political issues may have on labor.190  Because 
immigration is a political issue that has an undeniable impact on many 
aspects of the workplace, a good deal of employees’ immigration advocacy 
is indisputably protected labor advocacy.191  Now that we have exposed the 
historical and doctrinal roots of our framework, we will next discuss its 
implications for social movements and worker solidarity efforts. 
III. 
THE IMMIGRATION ADVOCACY AS LABOR ADVOCACY FRAMEWORK 
 IN PRACTICE 
Through Part I’s review of immigration law history and secondary 
literature on the intersection between immigration law and workplace law, 
and Part II’s doctrinal analysis of the NLRA, we developed our proposed 
immigration advocacy as labor advocacy framework.  This framework, 
which contends that we should view immigration law as a labor issue, has 
 
 187. Id.  See also Caterpillar, 1997 N.L.R.B. LEXIS at *29-30 (distinguishing general political 
support and support for legislation that directly relates to a specific matter of concern to employees). 
 188. See, e.g., Joaquin Guerra, SEIU EVP Eliseo Medina on Moving Immigration Reform Forward 
in 2010, Jan. 20, 2010, available at http://www.seiu.org/2010/01/seiu-evp-eliseo-medina-on-moving-
immigration-reform-forward-in-2010.php  (“We never thought of immigration reform as a partisan 
issue—we always knew we would need the support of both parties in order to pass 
comprehensive legislation.”). 
 189. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) (stating that, “on an issue that 
implicates its expertise in labor relations, a reasonable construction by the Board is entitled to 
considerable deference”). 
 190. Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569-70 (1978). 
 191. For an advocacy group that has explored this issue to some extent, see NATIONAL IMMIGRANT 
LAW CENTER, Immigrant Protests: What Every Worker Should Know (2006), available at 
http://v2011.nilc.org/ce/nilc/protests_what_every_worker_should_know.pdf (stating that employees 
“have the right to engage in political protests during non-work hours” and that employers cannot 
retaliation against employees “for engaging in political activity during [their] free time”). 
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implications for the immigration advocacy efforts of social movements and 
worker solidarity among immigrants and non-immigrants.192  In this Part we 
will discuss some of the opportunities created if social movements were to 
adopt such a framework more explicitly than they have previously.  This 
Part also acknowledges the existing barriers to fully realizing these 
possibilities in practice. 
The framework probably has the most relevance when it comes to 
workplace-based immigration advocacy activities.  By workplace-based 
activities we are referring broadly to various forms of education, 
organizing, or other joint immigration advocacy efforts among co-workers 
both inside and outside of their physical work site.  The framework could 
be applied most fruitfully to workplace-based activities, in part, because of 
Part II’s illustration that the NLRA has the potential to protect a wide range 
of workplace-based immigration advocacy efforts in both union and non-
union settings.  Moreover, the workplace can encourage “a sense of 
interdependence and common fate” among workers and can constitute “a 
significant deliberative forum for issues related to the particular workplace 
and to broader political issues.”193  While sometimes there are limits to the 
extent to which immigrants and non-immigrants can effectively 
communicate,194 the workplace is undoubtedly one of the few places that 
fosters interaction between immigrants and non-immigrants,195 thereby 
helping immigrants integrate “into their surrounding communities and 
larger society.”196 
While the framework has implications for advocacy efforts in all 
workplaces, it is likely to be particularly salient in workplaces that have 
both immigrant and non-immigrant workers.  In these mixed workforces, 
language and cultural differences can sometimes divide workers.  A vision 
of immigration as a labor issue could help immigrant workers to further 
“develop the capacity and incentive to engage fellow workers and citizens 
 
 192. See Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1161, 1167 (2008) (“As legal scholars, we are particularly interested in exploring laws, policies, and 
employer practices that could increase the potential for solidarity.”). 
 193. Id. at 1191 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: 
The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000)). 
 194. See id. at 1230 (contending that, although low-wage African American and Latino workers 
“come from different worlds . . . there are ways in which their interests are closely aligned” and there is 
“evidence of solidarity” efforts in the past). 
 195. See id. at 1191 (“In the perennially segregated United States, the workplace is a—perhaps the 
—place where people of different races and ethnicities regularly mix.”). 
 196. Lee, supra note 13, at 1109.  See also Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: 
Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 
237 (stating that adult immigrants have no access to “an assimilating institution” like a public school and 
that the workplace is one of the few places that “cultural adaptation” takes place); Gordon & Lenhardt, 
supra note 192, at 1168 (“Work serves a number of citizenship-and community-building functions.”). 
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to articulate and defend mutual interests—a process likely to promote social 
connectedness as well as broader forms of concerted or political action.”197  
Indeed, a shared vision that immigration issues are labor issues could 
provide a means for immigrant and non-immigrant employees to build ties 
with each other around issues of mutual concern, even though the law has 
often operated to separate these groups.198 
It is not only the shared vision that immigrant and non-immigrant 
workers have shared concerns about immigration law that may foster 
solidarity and promote immigration advocacy efforts.  The NLRA’s 
protection of some forms of immigration advocacy, described in Part II, 
could also play a crucial role.  The inclusion of workers’ collective 
immigration advocacy efforts within the NLRA’s protective scope could 
help to foster solidarity and inspire both immigrants and non-immigrants to 
participate in immigration advocacy efforts.  While there certainly are limits 
to the use of the law to bolster advocacy efforts,199 scholars have shown that 
legal claims and “rights talk” have sometimes supported the efforts of 
advocacy groups.200 
The framework, for instance, could lead to actual legal remedies or 
protections for individuals involved in certain advocacy efforts who 
experience an adverse employment action as a result of these activities.  
Through “legal discourses or social practices” both inside and outside of 
legal institutions, the framework could also play a more symbolic role.201  It 
could serve as “a powerful source of legitimacy” that helps advocates, even 
when law is not effectively enforced in practice.202  Through her study of 
humanitarian immigration advocacy groups along the Arizona-Mexico 
border, Professor Maria Lorena Cook convincingly illustrates that 
 
 197. Rodriguez, supra note 196, at 239. 
 198. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 192, at 1232-33 (stating that the “law has done little to 
foster cooperation” between low-wage African American and immigrant workers because it “renders it 
difficult for undocumented workers to assert their rights, offers limited tools for addressing workplace 
segregation, and grants minimal support to workers who act in solidarity across racial lines.”). 
 199. See generally Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the 
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1563 (1984). 
 200. See Anna-Maria Marshall, Injustice Frames, Legality, and the Everyday Construction of 
Sexual Harassment, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 659, 664 (2003) (stating that “‘rights talk’ can legitimize 
grievances by bridging frames and making connections between emerging grievances and long-
established legal rules” and “can be an important source of oppositional interpretations and meanings 
that raise consciousness and mobilize participants into a movement”); Francesca Polletta, The Structural 
Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
367, 386 (2000) (“Legal claims-making was thus one component of a political organizing strategy, not 
at odds with such a strategy.”). 
 201. Maria Lorena Cook, “Humanitarian Aid Is Never a Crime”: Humanitarianism and Illegality 
in Migrant Advocacy, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 561, 562 (2011). 
 202. Id. at 565 (stating that there is “a form of ‘legal consciousness’ that is mistrustful of the law, 
yet cognizant of its power to legitimize and protect”). 
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“subordinate groups may use legality claims for protection, but also to 
reframe debates, go on the offensive, and reduce differences in power, if 
only temporarily.”203 
Moreover, the framework’s focus on law could play a unique role 
when both documented and undocumented immigrant workers are involved 
in workplace-based immigration advocacy efforts.  Cook’s study 
demonstrated that the “illegality” of undocumented immigrants can pose 
challenges and shape advocates’ strategies in important ways.204  
Undocumented immigrants are sometimes viewed as “lawbreakers” from an 
immigration law vantage point.  According to the NLRA, however, these 
individuals are “employees” regardless of immigration status, and thus have 
the same NLRA rights as documented employees to engage in concerted 
activity around immigration reform.  Awareness of these NLRA rights may 
serve as a type of legitimacy-builder that unifies documented and 
undocumented workers around their mutual interests as workers. 
Moving forward, labor unions and organizations that work with low-
wage immigrants are best positioned to spearhead workplace-based 
immigration advocacy efforts.  As this Article has shown, labor unions have 
been active in immigration reform efforts.  They are well suited to bring 
immigrants and non-immigrants together around immigration advocacy 
because they are institutions that “connect immigrants not only with their 
own co-ethnics, but also with members of other immigrant groups and 
native-born Americans.”205  Similarly, worker centers, the nascent 
grassroots groups that organize “the most underserved and vulnerable 
groups” of low-wage and immigrant workers, have been protagonists in 
immigration advocacy efforts.206  Worker centers, like other emerging non-
union worker organizations, are dynamic institutions that are working to 
build a collective identity that crosses the immigration-labor divide.207  In 
 
 203. Id. at 587. 
 204. See id. at 563 (noting how the “illegality” of undocumented individuals can “shape and 
constrain the work of advocates”); see also id. at 564 (“[M]igrant ‘illegality’ presents a dilemma for 
advocates and an analytical challenge for scholars of grassroots activism and law.”). 
 205. Rodriguez, supra note 196, at 239. 
 206. Miriam A. Cherry, Working (with) Workers: Implementing Theory, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
731, 733 (2008).  See also JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING NEW COMMUNITIES AT THE 
EDGE OF THE DREAM 11 (2006) (describing the history and distinguishing features of worker centers); 
Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1896 
(2007) (“Lawyers filed Unfair Labor Practice charges pursuant to the NLRA against employers engaged 
in retaliatory actions against workers participating in worker center campaigns.”). 
 207. See e.g., Ruth Milkman, Immigrant Workers, Precarious Work, and the US Labor Movement, 
Globalizations 361, 363 (June 2011), available at http://www.ruthmilkman.info/rm/Articles_files/ 
globalizations%202011.pdf (describing workers’ centers as one of three “distinctive strands” of 
immigrant labor activism, and describing their work as “regularly organiz[ing] around not only 
workplace issues but also the social needs of low-wage immigrants”). 
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this way, they are also well positioned to bring immigrant and non-
immigrant workers together around their shared interests. 
There are, however, formidable challenges to implementing the 
framework in practice.  The NLRA, for instance, may not turn out to be an 
effective legal recourse for many employees who experience an adverse 
employment action due to their participation in workplace-based 
immigration advocacy.  Employees may not bring NLRA claims because 
they may not be aware of the NLRA’s protections, they may not believe 
that the NLRA/NLRB can protect them, or they may be hesitant to come 
forward because of their immigration status or the immigration status of 
their friends and family. 
Suspicions that the NLRA may provide inadequate protection from 
employer interference in practice are not entirely unfounded.  The NLRA, 
as interpreted by the NLRB and courts, undoubtedly has significant 
limitations.208  The NLRA’s protection of immigration advocacy, while 
broad, requires employees to connect their advocacy to the somewhat 
circumscribed set of interests described in Part II—workplace rights, wages 
and working conditions, or job opportunities or job security issues.  These 
frames may make it difficult for the labor movement to connect its 
advocacy message with other social movements in circumstances that do 
not involve employees’ interests as employees.  Moreover, the NLRA may 
not have efficient, or even sufficient, remedies for employees who face 
illegal employer retaliation due to their protected immigration advocacy 
efforts.209 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to implementing the immigration 
advocacy as labor advocacy framework is that undocumented immigrant 
 
 208. The NLRA and the NLRB are frequently and roundly critiqued as unable to effectively fulfill 
their central purposes to protect collective activity among employees from employer interference.  For 
critiques of the NLRA and NLRB see, Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act at 75: In 
Need of a Heart Transplant, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L. J. 311 (2010); Kati L. Griffith, The NLRA 
Defamation Defense: Doomed Dinosaur or Diamond in the Rough? 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 nn.3-7 
(2009); Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act Without 
Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1 (2009); Embracing Paradox, supra note 71; Cynthia 
L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002); Karl Klare, 
THE HORIZONS OF TRANSFORMATIVE LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, IN LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 3, 4 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 
2002). 
 209. See, e.g., Morris M. Keiner & David Weil, Evaluating the Effectiveness of National Labor 
Relations Act Remedies” Analysis and Comparison with Other Workplace Penalty Policies, NBER 
Working Paper Series (2010) (“We have shown that the benefits for individuals of winning a claim 
under the [NLRA] are comparatively small, meaning that the Act often fails to achieve even remediation 
of those whose rights have been violated.”).  In a recent case, Mezonos Maven Bakery, 2011 N.L.R.B. 
LEXIS 422, at *17 (2011), the NLRB interpreted Hoffman Plastics and concluded that undocumented 
workers are categorically precluded from a traditional NLRA back-pay remedy “regardless of whether 
the employee or employer violated IRCA.” 
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employees may be hesitant to engage in workplace-based immigration 
advocacy.  This is the case at least in part because, due to Hoffman Plastics 
and its progeny, undocumented workers have access to fewer legal 
remedies than their documented counterparts if they suffer an NLRA 
violation.210  Moreover, due to their status, undocumented employees may 
have a heightened fear of the possibility of a workplace-based immigration 
raid if they get involved or that an employer will engage in immigration-
based retaliation if they engage in concerted activity with their co-
workers.211 
Undoubtedly, it is difficult to build a united voice between immigrant 
and non-immigrant employees when there is a subclass of workers who 
may be fearful of engaging in collective action.212  The success of collective 
efforts related to immigration reform in mixed workforces may therefore 
ultimately depend on legal changes that adequately assure undocumented 
workers that they will not face negative immigration consequences related 
to collective activity or the assertion of their rights as employees.  Among 
other strategies, this could include affirmative educational programs and 
coordinated efforts between federal immigration authorities and federal 
labor authorities to avoid immigration enforcement during, or as a 
consequence of, employees’ collective activity.213 
CONCLUSION 
The immigration advocacy as labor advocacy framework provides a 
comprehensive analytical lens for viewing immigration law as a labor issue.  
A historical review of immigration law and relevant scholarship on the 
relationship between immigration law and employees’ workplace 
 
 210. Mezonos Maven Bakery, 2011 N.L.R.B. LEXIS at *19 n.5 (members Liebman and Pearce, 
concurring) (acknowledging that Hoffman Plastics “entails certain undesirable consequences as a matter 
of federal labor and immigration policy”); id. at *21 (stating that because the NLRB could not provide a 
“rudimentary remedy” to undocumented workers for the NLRA violations that they suffer, “employees 
are chilled in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, the work force is fragmented, and a vital check on 
workplace abuses is removed”). 
 211. Id. at *23 (stating that undocumented workers “face a double risk in taking concerted action—
not just as employees asserting their Section 7 rights . . . but as undocumented immigrants at risk of 
deportation”).  See also Lee, supra note 13, at 1109; Discovering ‘Immployment’ Law, supra note 11, at 
437 n.228. 
 212. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984) (“[E]xclud[ing] [undocumented aliens] 
‘from protections . . .’ would create ‘a subclass of workers without a comparable stake in the collective 
goals of their legally resident coworkers, thereby eroding the unity of all the employees”) (citing Jones 
& Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937)). 
 213. See Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089 (2011) 
(developing monitoring framework to ensure that immigration law is enforced without negative 
consequences for labor protections); see also ICE Was Not Meant to be Cold, supra note 45, at 1154 
(noting the importance of education to workers in any interagency monitoring effort). 
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protections illustrates that immigration law has been a labor issue for over a 
hundred years and that the relationship between these two statutory regimes 
has deepened since Congress enacted IRCA in 1986.  Moreover, a review 
of NLRA case law and its application to recent immigration advocacy 
efforts by labor unions further reveals the close connection between 
immigration law and labor issues. 
Thus, despite their divergent statutory roots and policymaking 
processes, immigration law is intricately connected to workplace law.214  As 
we discussed in the Introduction, those who have examined the relationship 
between immigration law and workplace law have predominantly focused 
on immigration law’s negative effects on employees’ workplace 
protections.  This focus is justified given the myriad ways immigration law 
has eroded labor protections for employees.  But viewing immigration law 
and workplace law in relationship to one another can also yield an 
unexpected broadening of employees’ workplace protections,215 because 
employees’ immigration advocacy is, in many ways, protected labor 
advocacy. 
The Article, however, not only contributes to the existing scholarship 
on the relationship between immigration law and workplace law.  Part II’s 
doctrinal analysis of the NLRA, for instance, also has implications for legal 
cases that may emerge when employees face adverse employment actions 
because of their engagement in workplace-based immigration advocacy 
efforts.  Moreover, as discussed in Part III, the framework informs law and 
organizing debates, social movement strategy and worker solidarity efforts 
between immigrants and non-immigrants.  In sum, as immigration law 
ventures further into the workplace, it becomes even more important for 
 
 214. For an argument that the policymaking process should be considered simultaneously, see Juan 
F. Perea, Destined for Servitude, Speech at the University of San Francisco Law Review Symposium: 
The Evolving Definition of the Immigrant Worker: The Intersection Between Employment, Labor, and 
Human Rights Law (Feb. 27, 2009), in 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 245, 252 (2009) (arguing that “immigration 
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NLRB level.  See Catherine L. Fisk and Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: 
Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2018 (2009) 
(“Solutions to the NLRB's problems are less likely to come from labor law reform in Congress than 
from closer attention to the demands of administrative law by all charged with review and oversight of 
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scholars, adjudicators, enforcement agents, advocates, workers, and 
policymakers to view immigration law as a labor issue.216 
 
 216. See Ghost Workers, supra note 10, at 765 (2003) (“On the books, immigration law and labor 
law are separate bodies of law, but in action they are interconnected statutory schemes.”); Decker, supra 
note 62, at 2195 (analyzing IRCA “through the lens of labor law” and proposing that Congress “amend 
IRCA to provide a strong and clear rule suspending employers’ verification duties during labor 
disputes”). 
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